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Abstract 
At the Barcelona Meeting in March 2002, the EU member-states agreed upon a common policy 
goal to increase expenditures for research and development to 3% of GDP by 2010. In 2005 this 
target was also adopted by the Norwegian Government. This thesis is a case study of how and 
why the 3% objective became a goal in Norwegian research and development (R&D) policy. The 
adoption of the EU target is considered a case of policy diffusion through Europeanisation. A 
combination of features from theories used in Science and Technology Studies and Political 
Science is employed to show how different approaches to innovation and diffusion can help 
explain policy transfer from the EU to the national level. Furthermore, the combination of 
theories is used to analyse different actors and arguments involved in the diffusion process. The 
arguments were divided into interest-based, idea-based, and rule-based claims according to the 
motivations and mechanisms underlying them. Concluding remarks drawn from the study 
indicate that the adoption of the 3% target into Norwegian R&D policy was indeed a result of 
policy diffusion. Furthermore, the case points out how the identification of actors’ interest-based, 
idea-based, and rule-based arguments can be vital for understanding the process leading to the 
transfer of this EU policy goal. However, while the combination of theories of diffusion and 
innovation are useful for explaining the Norwegian adoption of the 3% objective, its explanatory 
power is substantially reduced when trying to assess the implementation, or lack of 
implementation of this R&D policy goal. 
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1. Introduction 
Norwegian research and development (R&D) policies in the post-war period have been 
characterised by a large degree of consensus concerning priorities and policy decisions. There has 
been little political debate and disagreements related to research policies, even across the 
traditional cleavage lines of Norwegian politics and between political parties (Kaloudis 2004:8-9; 
Skoie 2005:265). This trend of domestic policy consensus is to a very large extent valid also for 
Norway’s increasingly close relations to research performed in the European Union (EU) (Skoie 
2005:259). 
 
Europeanisation, the diffusion or transfer of policy practices and processes from the EU to the 
national level, can be one consequence of close coordination, cooperation and manifold linkages 
between Norwegian and European R&D policies (Gornitzka 2006:23). Policy transfer can be 
considered crucial for policy formation as it introduces new impulses, and thereby leads to 
innovative processes, practices and goals within national R&D policy. The rapprochement 
through diffusion takes place although developments at the European level leave considerable 
discretion to domestic actors and institutions and although the actual ability of the EU level to 
penetrate domestic institutions is neither perfect, universal, nor constant (Olsen 2002:936). The 
close ties can, rather, be seen as a result of adaptational pressure to conform with EU policies 
which can be seen as fairly strong not only in EU member-states but also in the Union’s 
neighbouring countries (Trondal 2002:338). 
 
The objective of increasing expenditures for R&D to 3% of GDP by 2010 which was decided 
upon by the EU-states at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 (European Parliament 2002:20), can be 
considered an innovation in the field of R&D policy. The innovativeness of this policy objective 
consists not only of its ambitiousness and concreteness. It is also a comprehensive objective as it 
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involves all EU member-states and demands their cooperation and the coordination of domestic 
R&D policies in order to be achieved. In the year 2005 the Norwegian Government decided to 
introduce the 3% goal into national R&D policy as well. Consequently, the policy objective was 
diffused into the Norwegian context. Since 1999 the Norwegian expenditures for R&D as a 
percentage of national GDP have varied between 1,53–1,73% (NIFU STEP 2007). Consequently, 
the Norwegian Government was far from reaching its former goal of R&D investments which 
was the average expenditures of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) of approximately 2,3% of GDP (OECD 1996a:10; St.mld.1 1998-1999:7). Therefore, the 
new R&D policy goal adjusted to EU standards, was a very ambitious one (Skoie 2005:250) and 
represented a landmark also in Norwegian context. 
 
In order to understand Norwegian R&D policy-making, therefore, it can be seen as necessary to 
understand how and why policy innovation through diffusion happens. Consequently, it also 
becomes important to analyse the underlying mechanisms and factors motivating actors and 
shaping arguments in the process leading to policy adoption. This thesis will seek answers to 
these questions in the case of the adoption of the EU goal of increasing expenditures for R&D to 
3% of GDP by 2010 into Norwegian R&D policy. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. I will conduct a case study of how the 3% objective became a 
goal in Norwegian R&D policy in order to investigate what processes can lead to policy transfer 
from the EU into the Norwegian context. I look at this process as a potential case of policy 
diffusion through Europeanisation. Therefore, in order to obtain a greater understanding of these 
policy processes, I will also review a broad spectre of theoretical perspectives drawn from the 
                                                 
1 St.mld., Stortingsmelding, Report to the Parliament (Storting). These reports are used when the Government wants to present 
issues for the Storting without proposing a decision. They often form the basis of a proposition (cf. footnote 9). 
 
  3 
 
fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Political Science. I aim at combining 
common traits from these theories to show how approaches to innovation and diffusion from 
both more technical and more political areas of study, can help explain the adoption of policy 
from the EU to the national level. Furthermore, I see it as important to consider the international 
context surrounding and contributing to diffusion of policies into the domestic sphere. Both the 
OECD and the EU can be regarded as vital communication channels for diffusion processes 
(Mörth 1998:43,46,50). I will, therefore, discuss R&D policy formation and developments in 
these two organisations and relate it to the Norwegian context. By combining the theoretical 
perspectives from STS and political science and keeping the international context of the OECD 
and the EU in mind, I will then analyse actors and arguments involved in adopting the 3% target, 
in order to discern the different mechanisms underlying and motivating the policy decision.  
 
My research questions are 
• why and how has the objective of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy to increase R&D 
expenditures to 3% of GDP by 2010 become a Norwegian policy goal? 
and furthermore 
• what actors and arguments were involved in this policy adoption process? 
 
1.2 The concept of the knowledge-based society 
Today, economies of countries in what is considered the western world are increasingly based on 
gaining, holding and providing information and knowledge. A report published in 1996 showed 
that the economies of member-states of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development were more than ever before depending on production, distribution, and use of 
knowledge (OECD 1996a:9). The same report estimated that more than 50% of GDP in major 
OECD countries was knowledge-based. The European Union defines a knowledge society as a 
society where “research, education, training and innovation are fully mobilised to fulfil the 
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economic, social and environmental ambitions of the EU and the expectations of its citizens” 
(European Commission 2007a). And Norwegian politicians use terms like ‘knowledge raise’, 
‘knowledge economy’, and ‘knowledge society’ as part of their everyday language, and Norway 
even has its own ‘Ministry of Knowledge’ (Kunnskapsdepartementet2 2007, my translation).  
 
The main reason for this rather new, enlarged focus on knowledge is that its relative importance 
as one of the main drivers of economic growth and creation of welfare both at the individual and 
the community level, has been recognised. Furthermore, some knowledge is a precondition for 
gaining more. There is a constant quest for increased knowledge about the world and the society 
we have created, and a need to adapt this knowledge to the ever changing environment. 
Consequently, R&D activities become vital as they not only enhance the knowledge base of 
society, but also supply economy and society with the means needed to handle new challenges 
and make progress. Investments into knowledge and R&D can raise the capacity of other factors 
of production, generate increasing returns, and thereby enhance economic growth (Frønes 2005). 
Because, as pointed out by professor Ivar Frønes, “productivity is no longer placed primarily in 
machines but in peoples’ heads”. However, he continues, “knowledge and education are much 
more than factors of production; the knowledge society refers to the cultural and social 
significance of knowledge as well” (ibid.:10, my translation). 
 
Consequently, in addition to ensure investments into new knowledge through among others 
R&D activities, the spread of information and learning is considered crucial for building the new 
knowledge-based society. This can happen through diffusion and transfer of knowledge between 
firms, sectors, regions or countries (Hall 2005). The processes leading to the diffusion of research 
and development results and the new knowledge they create, are depending on a variety of actors 
and their efforts to develop and maintain society’s knowledge base. Systems and networks 
                                                 
2 Kunnskapsdepartementet, Ministry of Education and Research. 
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created by these actors are of key importance both to the creation and the efficient distribution of 
knowledge and information. (OECD 1996b)  
 
The realisation and recognition of the positive role played by knowledge has not only affected 
strategies concerning economic development, the personal strive for skills, investments into 
R&D and efforts to spread knowledge and information throughout society. The increased focus 
upon knowledge is also felt in the area of politics and policies as it furthers political change, 
shapes political debates, and influences the field of policy formation. This is among others seen 
as the field of R&D policy has gained importance and receives increased attention from central 
policy actors such as researchers, economists, scholars, politicians and other interest groups. As 
R&D activities create new knowledge, it can be argued that the actors involved and the ideas and 
interest reflected, in the formation of R&D policy goals will have the possibility to greatly 
influencing the basis of the knowledge society.  
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The first part of this thesis has given a short introduction to the topic of my case study and 
outlined the research questions which will be addressed. Theoretical perspectives drawn upon in 
this study will be outlined in Chapter two. This chapter provides a review of the literature 
regarding different aspects of innovation related both to diffusion, organisations, systems and 
regulations, literature on policy transfer, as well as approaches treating policy formation through 
processes of Europeanisation. The review will identify the main bodies of literature and the main 
debates within the fields of innovation and studies of policy diffusion and Europeanisation, and 
locate my research within this theoretical area. Consequently, traits from the relevant approaches 
are combined into a theory frame forming the foundation of this thesis. The last part of Chapter 
two shows and discusses the methodological background used to answer my research question. 
Chapter three concerns the advent of the field of R&D policies in general, and more specifically 
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the development of R&D policies within the OECD, the EU, and the Norwegian context. This 
chapter thereby outlines international and national conditions under which policy diffusion might 
take place, that are relevant for the case of Norway’s adoption of the 3% target. Chapter four 
contains my analysis of the processes leading to the transfer of the 3% goal into Norwegian R&D 
policy, including central actors and arguments. The theoretical framework created as a result of 
the literature review in Chapter two, will guide the analysis of the different actors’ arguments and 
claims regarding the introduction of the EU goal. The last part of Chapter four will discuss the 
situation and debates in the area of R&D policy after the introduction of the 3% objective. 
Finally, Chapter five sums up the main findings, their theoretical implications and the study’s 
relevance concerning future scenarios in the field of R&D policy. 
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2. Theoretical perspectives on innovation, diffusion 
and policy transfer – Literature review and 
conceptual building blocks 
Policy change and the impact of European integration on domestic policies can be studied from a 
number of perspectives. Some focus on individual actors, others on organisations or institutions. 
Some emphasise external, others internal factors. Some claim the importance of political 
structures, network effects, models of rationality, learning and imitation, or diffusion as the main 
factors driving the innovation process (Black 2005b:16). These different explanations and 
understandings of innovation are, however, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Often they may be 
combined to generate new and deeper understandings of how the European sphere influences 
the national level. This chapter will address the following question: What insights from the field 
of STS, and what approaches to the study of policy change and Europeanisation can potentially 
contribute to the understanding of my case? 
 
In the following chapter I will describe and discuss various theoretical approaches from the 
literature on diffusion and the different strands studying innovation. These are theory 
perspectives traditionally found, and extensively used, in the field of Science and Technology 
Studies. Furthermore, an overview of political science theories concerned with regulatory and 
policy innovation and Europeanisation of policies, is provided. This is done because when 
pursuing an answer to the question of how the EU 3% target became a Norwegian policy goal 
and what actors and arguments were involved in this policy transfer, both political science and 
STS theories can be considered useful. Not least it will be valuable to combine the approaches 
deriving from these two fields of theory. I will show how not only perspectives on policy 
innovation and Europeanisation, but also those occupied with innovation and diffusion from a 
more scientific and technical point of view, can contribute to the understanding of policy 
formation. Especially, the STS’s focus upon the variables underlying diffusion of innovations, 
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organisational innovation and systems of innovation are of interest. A combination of STS and 
social science theories will reflect the complexity of the process of national adoption of European 
policies. Moreover, it is likely to increase, by both broadening and deepening, the understanding 
of how policy innovations at the European level become national policies.  
 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives on innovation and diffusion 
2.1.1 Innovation and diffusion 
“[W]ithout diffusion, innovation would have little social or economic impact” (Hall 2005:459). 
Diffusion can be seen as “the socially mediated spread of a policy or practice [and] its 
communication over time among members of a social system” (Rogers 2003:14). This includes 
both the adoption of a new, and the replacement of an old practice or process. Consequently, 
diffusion, also known as transfer or imitation, is an intrinsic part of the innovation process as are 
mechanisms of learning and feedback which enhance the original innovation and drive the 
diffusion process forward. This is the case also for policy formation and change happening 
through innovation, which often includes the transfer of policies and practices between countries. 
Major R&D policy goals such as enhancing social welfare and augmenting economic 
development and the amount of knowledge available to society, can be seen as dependent on 
diffusion and spread of information. As policy innovations are likely to improve conditions in the 
field where they are implemented, the decision to adopt an innovation is usually not seen as 
choosing between adopting or not adopting. Rather it is a question of adopting now or adopting 
later. (Black 2005a:7-9; Hall 2005:459-460,478-480)  
 
The processes of innovation, the implementation of innovations and diffusion, are not as linear 
and uniform as it may seem after this description. They will take different forms depending on 
whether it is a product, a process or a policy that is diffused, and in what policy area it is taking 
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place (ibid.). Consequently, there are several conceptual frameworks trying to understand the 
diffusion of innovations, both why and how it happens. The most important of these can be seen 
as: Explanations used by sociologists and organisational behaviour theorists; views put forward 
by economists; and marketing literature on diffusion (Hall 2005:461-465). Although each of these 
theories seems to be linked to a separate field of study, insights from one explanatory framework 
can be used to understand diffusion mechanisms within several disciplines. As pointed out above, 
such a combination of theories will be important when answering the research question of this 
thesis. 
  
Sociologists and organisational behaviour theorists often focus on the external environment 
when trying to explain the diffusion of innovations. One of the main contributions to this branch 
of literature, are Rogers’ analytical categories classifying the attributes influencing potential 
adopters of an innovation (2003). Among these are the relative advantage of the innovation, the 
compatibility between the innovation and the current way of doing things and between the 
innovation and social norms, the ease with which the innovation can be tested and evaluated by a 
potential adopter. Moreover, the speed of diffusion can be crucial for the implementation of 
innovations and whether they are a success or a failure. This is among others determined by 
whether the decision to innovate is made collectively, by individuals, or by a central authority 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the norms, values, institutions and degree of interconnectedness of the 
social system in which the potential adopter is embedded, are also important (Hall 2005:462).  
 
Economists’ view of factors influencing innovation and diffusion often involve strategic 
calculations. The innovation and diffusion process is described as an aggregate result of a series 
of rational individual calculations that weigh the benefits of adopting the innovation against the 
costs of change. Consequently, actors’ self-interests and goals play a major role. However, the 
environment in which calculations are carried out is characterised by uncertainty and limited 
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information. The rate of diffusion is thus not only seen as determined by individuals’ rational 
decisions, but to a great extent influenced by external factors. Nevertheless, the economists’ 
approach is often criticised for not taking social feedback mechanisms into account to the same 
extent as is done by sociologists. The main argument made by these critiques is that social 
connectedness and network effects will result in social feedback and consequently bandwagon 
effects, as the adoption of an innovation by one individual will encourage also others to innovate. 
(Ibid.:462-463) 
 
The marketing literature on diffusion is first and foremost focused on the questions of how to 
encourage consumers to endorse innovations, and how to detect or forecast the success of these 
innovations in the marketplace. The role of media information, social networks, characteristics of 
the innovation and of its source, are often emphasised when mapping the factors that can be 
influenced in order to increase the number of actors willing to choose a particular innovation. 
(Ibid.:464) 
 
Hence, the literature points out a crucial distinction between internal and external factors and the 
role they play in diffusion processes. In the case of Norway and the 3% target, this distinction 
implies considering characteristics of the external environment, including the international policy 
environment in general and more specific the EU’s R&D policy, as the locus and source of 
innovation. Also, internal or local conditions such as the characteristics of Norwegian R&D 
policy and the national political context, are likely to be important.  
 
2.1.2 Organisational innovation 
“In a general sense, the term “organizational innovation” refers to the creation or adoption of an 
idea or behavior new to the organization” (Lam 2005:115). It involves “a complex mix of 
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individuals, organizational culture, organizational structure and organizational environment” 
(Black 2005b:20). 
 
One of the main advantages of the organisational approach to innovation is that it allows great 
emphasis to be put on learning, creative change and innovation within the organisation itself. 
Moreover, it also includes the possibility that differences in organisational interpretations of, and 
responses to, external stimuli can affect the outcomes of change (Lam 2005:123-138). 
Consequently, theories on organisational innovation can be seen as relevant for the discussion of 
why and how the EU’s 3% objective for R&D expenditures became a Norwegian policy goal, as 
this process of policy adoption can be said to involve, among others, learning and innovation as a 
result of external influence. Alice Lam (ibid.:116) claims that there are two broad perspectives 
from which it is possible to reveal the relationship between organisations and innovative activity.  
 
The first perspective described, is that of organisational design theories which consider how 
structural characteristics of an organisation are linked to its propensity to innovate (ibid.:117-
122). This perspective’s emphasis on social networks can to some extent be compared to that 
found in the marketing literature on diffusion, as described above. The organisational design 
approach focuses on the micro-level and explains innovation as a result of organisational culture, 
structure and decision-making processes which are decentralised and highly flexible (Black 
2005b:24). Accordingly, as among others described by Mintzberg (1979) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991), successful organisations have capacity to change and will therefore design their 
structure to match the environment which tends to become increasingly unpredictable and 
uncertain. A new structure including more organic and fluid forms of organisation may be crucial 
in order to overcome inertia and face arising challenges (Chandler 1962; Mohr 1969; Osborne 
1998). This flexibility and tendency to innovate is, however, also a result of rational decision-
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making and managerial strategic choice, and an effort to enhance and preserve an organisation’s 
competitive advantage (Black 2005b:23). 
 
Secondly, there are theories of organisational cognition and learning which focus on how 
organisations develop and exploit new ideas for problem solving and innovative activities. As 
opposed to the structural theories described above, this perspective portrays the ideal 
organisational innovation as a discontinuous, creative process. Innovations are not only the 
output of an organisation’s structural features, but also a result of accumulated knowledge which 
enables organisations to acquire and exploit new knowledge. (Lam 2005:123; Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990:126-130) A challenge for all organisations that wish to evolve through learning, 
however, is to avoid letting core capabilities and inertial forces which provide stability, also turn 
into core rigidities and path dependencies which make the organisation resistant to change. 
Consequently, external sources of innovation can be crucial. It is also important to emphasise the 
role of differences in national institutional frameworks, created through possibilities and 
constraints arising from different societal contexts and institutions. As the EU’s Barcelona target 
can be considered an external source, the extent to which the 3% objective is used as an 
argument in the national R&D debate constitutes an example of how external factors produce 
internal change. This is underlined by the assumption that without the EU’s 3% goal such an 
investment target would not have been introduced domestically, and Norway would still have the 
OECD goal as its national R&D expenditure objective. In line with this, evolutionary theorists 
like Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that organisations accumulate knowledge as they develop 
and that organisational change usually occurs “as a product of the search for new practices in the 
neighborhood of an organization’s existing practices” (Lam 2005:134). This also means that 
organisations to a greater extent are involved in changes which gradually enhance and enlarge 
their competence rather than radical changes and entrepreneurial activity (ibid.:135). The strategic 
adaptation theory is another strand of organisational cognition and learning theory which claims 
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that both continuity and creativity is needed to foster organisational development and change. 
While continuity creates a sense of identity, provides political legitimacy and increases the 
acceptability of change, creativity brings new elements into the development process. (Gersick 
1991:14-21; Romanelli and Tushman 1994:1152-1166) Because of the focus on the micro-level 
and problem solving, this perspective of organisational cognition and learning can be compared 
to the economist view on innovation and diffusion. However, the fact that this second category 
of organisational innovation also involves cognition and learning, makes it similar to the 
sociologists and organisational behaviourists approach as well.  
 
Regarding the theoretical perspectives of organisational innovation, some traits are of greater 
relevance for my case study than others. As for the innovation and diffusion approaches, 
awareness of external factors, networks between external and internal factors, as well as factors of 
cognition and learning, are considered important. Another similarity between the organisation 
oriented and the diffusion oriented strands of theory which is relevant for this thesis, is the focus 
upon the micro-level, including among others national actors’ rational actions and strategic 
adaptation. I expect these actors to have been crucial for the adoption of the 3% target into 
Norwegian R&D policies. Also, I expect internal conditions, such as national institutional 
frameworks and the possibilities and constraints and problem-solving abilities involved in these, 
to be influential. This focus on both individual and networks of actors can be seen as pointing to 
how great flexibility and evolutionary processes are involved in policy adoptions. 
 
2.1.3 Systems of innovation 
“Research and innovation policies [...] are transversal and systemic in nature” (Ugur et al. 
2006:250). This description of R&D policies can be seen as taken into account in Norway’s “plan 
for a ‘holistic’ innovation policy, with its emphasis upon network interaction and policy 
integration” (Remøe et al. 2004:31). 
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 As shown in the discussions on innovation and diffusion, and organisational innovation, 
innovative activity seldom happens in isolation. Outcomes of R&D and innovation processes 
depend on the multitude of actors involved in these processes, and the relationships between the 
actors. Therefore, in order to shape R&D and innovative activities and create the desired results, 
it is important to understand who these actors are, and how they relate in their network of 
innovative activities (Edquist 2005:184-185,190-191). A system of innovation (SI) consists of “all 
the important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that 
influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations” (ibid.:182). By employing an SI 
approach it will be possible to identify the variety of actors influencing the innovation process of 
interest, and get a grip on how the different components, they being organisations, firms or 
individuals, relate and combine to form relevant constellations. 
 
The relationships between the different factors of an SI, influencing R&D and innovation, will 
usually include either competition, transaction, or networking. Also, a certain amount of 
interactive learning is crucial for the dynamic of innovation (ibid.:190-191). Becoming aware of 
these features of the SI approach, makes it applicable to and useful for, understanding the 
process of policy formation. This includes also the understanding of the development of R&D 
policy, and more specifically Norway’s adoption of the EU’s 3% goal. In this process, the 
constellations of actors and the significance of institutions become, as argued more extensively 
later on, especially pronounced. 
 
The boundaries of a system of innovation can be sectoral, regional, national or even global. 
Consequently, the EU and its effort to integrate national R&D policies through the program for 
the establishment of a common European research area (ERA), can be considered one such 
innovation system. However, although international cooperation and the formation of systems 
across national borders are becoming increasingly important, the nation state still has a great 
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influence over what actual policies will be implemented in the field of R&D (ibid.:198-199). 
Therefore, national systems of innovations (NISs) are those most commonly focused upon in SI 
studies. A national system of innovation can be said to consist of those factors within a nation 
state influencing innovation and R&D processes. However, while most scholars agree on this 
rather vague definition, some disagree on what factors constitute the most important 
determinants of research, development and innovation. Bernt Lundvall (1992:10) has argued that 
the institutional set-up and the structure of production are the two most important dimensions 
defining a NSI. Nelson and Rosenberg (1993:5,9-11), on the other hand, claim organisations 
supporting R&D to be the main sources of innovation. Understanding what factors are 
determining R&D activities can be vital in order to enable the formation of effective policies. 
 
I expect the SI approach to give valuable insight concerning my research question. On the one 
hand, the perspective directs attention towards the systemic level and network effects influencing 
innovation and R&D processes. On the other hand, its focus on different actors and the 
relationships and constellations among them which are characterised by both competition and 
cooperation, can be seen as relevant. Furthermore, learning processes and competence building 
taking place both within and between systems, are regarded as important. The SI approach seeks 
to reach a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of innovation, which I expect will 
be crucial also in this thesis. 
 
These paragraphs have reviewed theoretical perspectives on diffusion and innovation drawn from 
STS, which can be seen to increased understanding of my research question. Furthermore, 
expectations about what factors and processes have influenced the adoption of the 3% target, 
have been outlined. In the following, theories from Political Science on policy and regulatory 
diffusion and innovation as well as theories on Europeanisation, will be discussed as these are 
also expected to be relevant for this case study. 
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2.1.4 Regulatory and policy innovation and diffusion 
The concept of diffusion has its origins in biology and was later, as shown above, also applied to 
the transfer of technologies and innovations and processes in an organisational and systemic 
context. Furthermore, it can be of relevance for policy formation and decision-making, and the 
study of policy innovation and diffusion has become a major topic in political science (Tyran and 
Sausgruber 2003:2). The policy diffusion approach tries to understand what causes a government 
and other political actors to adopt and promote a new policy. This question is of major relevance 
to this thesis, and in the following paragraphs some theories of policy innovation and diffusion 
will therefore be considered. A theoretical approach to regulatory innovation is also included as 
this can be seen to assert great influence on both process and outcome of policy transfer. (Black 
2005a,b) 
 
First, however, I see it as important to draw a distinction between the concept of policy diffusion 
and policy translation. Translation refers to a process of change happening to ideas and practices 
as they travel from one country or social context to another. As pointed out by Gornitzka “[t]he 
definition of problems or solutions may change, or solutions become linked to other problems, 
and in this sense a transformation has occurred” (2006:22). This will happen because the actors 
involved want to shape the new ideas to make them fit into their own frame of reference 
(ibid.:20). In a process of diffusion, on the other hand, the policy adopted remains unchanged. 
This is the case although the context the policy is diffused and adopted into may be totally 
different from the one where the policy originated. I expect Norway’s adoption of the 3% target 
to be an instance of diffusion, as the objective can be said not to have changed in any significant 
way during this process. 
 
Regulation can, according to Black (2005a:11), be understood as the “sustained and focused 
attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to standards or goals with the intention of 
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producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of 
standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification”. The aim of regulatory 
innovation, therefore, becomes to renew and thereby improve these standards and goals of 
behaviour (ibid.:3-4). As a result, this perspective is one commonly employed for the analysis of 
political decisions and policy implementation. The main approaches to regulatory innovations 
are, as described by Black, the individual, the organisational, the state and the global polity 
perspective. In the following I will concentrate on outlining the individual, the state, and the 
global polity perspectives of innovation as these are the most relevant for my further writing and 
since the organisational approach to innovations has been outlined above (2005a). 
 
The individual perspective explains innovations as a result of the presence, actions and influence 
of one, or a small number, of key individuals, usually sharing certain personality and socio-
economic characteristics. In the case of organisational, institutional or policy innovations it is also 
crucial that the actors occupy strategic positions with respect to the decision-making process. 
These policy entrepreneurs will try to win support for their views and ideas on what and how to 
innovate, and their strategies can vary between networking, shaping debates, identifying problems 
and building coalitions (Black 2005b:18-19). In a Norwegian context of innovation policy, such 
entrepreneurs can be crucial in order to gain a good understanding of innovation and realise 
policy visions (European Commission 2006a:17).  
 
The main factor of analysis in the state perspective on innovation is government, “either taken as 
an aggregate, or occasionally a particular unit of government” (Black 2005b:25). The perspective 
has its origin in the field of political science, and most theories of public policy formation can 
therefore be of relevance to state innovation. However, especially two main strands of political 
science literature are relevant for innovation, namely that on policy diffusion and that on policy 
learning. For policy diffusion to happen, several internal and external factors of importance for a 
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state’s innovative activity, have to be in place. Some scholars claim that it is the internal political, 
economic and social characteristics of the state that cause it to adopt a new program or policy. 
Among the external factors influencing the propensity to innovate, one of the most relevant is 
the motivation provided by role models. Berry and Berry (1999) are among those who claim that 
“states emulate each other’s policies for one or more of three reasons: reasoning by analogy, 
competition, and public pressure”. Following this view, decisions which lead to innovative action 
are not taken by states in isolation, but are strongly influenced by the decisions of other states. As 
opposed this focus on the rate of adoption and convergence, scholars concerned with policy 
learning focus on the substance of policy decisions (ibid.). Bennet (1991, 1997) and Rose (1993) 
show how the literature on policy learning seeks to identify more closely the causes, motivations, 
mechanisms, types and degrees of policy formation and transfer. Furthermore, the actors 
involved in and the outcome of policy transfer, are crucial for explaining these processes. Policy 
transfer creates and shapes the political agenda, and involves searching for the most suitable 
policy solution, working against group pressure, or legitimating actions already made. 
 
The global polity perspective on innovation focuses on decision- and policy-making by 
international organisations, institutions or networks. This approach is important as a supplement 
to the state perspective because states often let international organisations instruct them what 
actions to take and what decisions to make. Also, the decision-making system of states is 
sometimes bypassed when international organisations adopt policies which become operative at 
state-level without the state itself taking action to implement the policy. According to Black 
(2005b:33), innovation in the global polity environment can to a large extent be explained by 
actions taken by such international networks or webs of actors. Scholars such as Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000:532-549) counter this claim by arguing that these communication networks are not 
enough to diffuse innovations. Instead they point out other mechanisms, such as modelling, 
considered to influence global policy innovation. Modelling or imitation 
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may begin as a proactive sequence, in which individual policy entrepreneurs enrol in the organizational power 
of other actors, or it may begin as a reactive sequence as governments seek to respond to public pressure 
generated by a disaster or scandal, and seek around for a policy to adopt.  
(Braithwaite and Drahos:561-562)  
 
Moreover, modelling can occur because of a fear to lag behind or be less successful than 
potential competitors. 
 
Several traits drawn from the approaches to regulatory and policy innovation can be seen as 
important for this thesis. Concerning the individual perspective, I especially expect the influence 
of politicians and ministry employees, as well as other individual actors and policy entrepreneurs 
in the R&D sector, to play a major role. Also, the state perspective’s focus upon internal factors, 
as the timing of political elections, and external factors, as the use of states as role models, can be 
seen as important. The same can be said regarding the processes of learning and identifying 
motivations and mechanisms involved in policy innovation and diffusion. Networks, institutions 
and international organisations emphasised by the global perspective, are also likely to be of 
relevance. Finally, I expect mechanisms such as standard-setting, behaviour-modification and 
modelling to have influence on the process of adopting the 3% goal into Norwegian politics. 
 
2.2 Transfer and diffusion in a European political context - 
Europeanisation 
Europeanisation is a multifaceted phenomenon. As a result, it is not easily described and defined. 
Olsen has argued that the term ‘Europeanisation’ is “applied in a number of ways to describe a 
variety of phenomena and processes of change” (2002:921). Furthermore, “[n]o shared definition 
has emerged”. However, the different conceptions of Europeanisation do not exclude, but rather 
complement each other. In the following the perspective of Europeanisation as a specific case of 
policy diffusion and transfer will be described and discussed, in order to discern its implications 
for my research question. 
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Olsen (2007:70-71) describes five possible meanings of the term Europeanisation. These involve 
Europeanisation as: 1) Changes in external territorial boundaries. Here, the degree to which 
Europe as a geographical entity is turning into a single political space is considered. 2) 
Development of institutions of governance at the European level. 3) Domestic adaptation to 
central, international regulations involving a multi-level system of governance. 4) Exporting 
forms of political organisation and governance typical for Europe, beyond the European 
territory. This is a result of Europe’s relatively strong impact on countries and processes in other 
parts of the world. 5) A political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe. 
 
Featherstone (2003:3) on the other hand, broadly classifies Europeanisation into two categories 
by arguing that  
 
[i]n a maximalist sense, the structural change that [Europeanisation] entails must fundamentally be of a 
phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 
‘Europe’. Minimally, ‘Europeanization’ involves a response to the policies of the European Union (EU).  
 
Among the maximalist interpretations he includes the categories of Europeanisation as a 
historical and as a cultural diffusion process. On the other hand, among the minimalist 
approaches, Featherstone mentions the processes of institutional adaptation and the adaptation 
of policy and policy processes (ibid.:5-6). His classification can be compared with the third and 
the fourth of Olsen’s meanings of Europeanisation. 
 
Radaelli (2003:30) provides a more specific but at the same time comprehensive, definition of 
Europeanisation as  
 
[p]rocesses of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. 
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In short, he argues that the political, social and economic processes of the European Union 
become a natural part of domestic politics and policy processes. In the context of this thesis, 
Radaelli’s definition has the advantage that it is applicable both to EU member-states and other 
countries, includes both organisations and individuals, and puts emphasis on policy-making. 
 
The EU is becoming more and more a relevant and important point of political reference for 
actors, in the international arena as well as at member-state level. Furthermore, the effects of 
Europeanisation are claimed to be felt even outside current member-states (Grabbe 2003). 
Today, Europeanisation is mostly associated with the diffusion of structures, institutions and 
policies from the EU to a domestic level as result of mechanisms such as learning, and 
adaptational pressure coming directly or indirectly from Union membership. These acts of 
adoption usually involve changes in policy practices, but seldom entail major modifications. Shifts 
in cognition, discourse, and identity can, however, be part of the changes taking place 
(Featherstone 2003:7-9,20). What then, is encompassed in this concept of Europeanisation and 
what mechanisms are involved in this diffusion process? 
 
2.2.1 Two main types of Europeanisation – vertical and horizontal 
There are two overarching categories of Europeanisation, the vertical and the horizontal. The 
former emphasises the clear demarcation of the EU level where policies are made, as opposed to 
the domestic level where policies are put into practice. The latter sees Europeanisation as a 
process without pressure to conform to EU policy models, but rather an adjustment based on 
economic and social patterns (Radaelli 2003:41).  
 
Vertical Europeanisation is mainly emanating from adaptational pressure, international regulatory 
competition and the exploration of policy opportunities. There is a real and perceived difference 
across levels of governance as to the content of policy which fosters Europeanisation of among 
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other research and educational policy (ibid.). The perspective can be divided into what 
Nedergaard (2006:424-425) calls the ‘compliance approach’ and the ‘opportunity structure 
approach’. According to this ‘compliance approach’, adaptational pressure will occur if there is 
divergence or misfit between the policies, politics or institutions at the European level and those 
at the national level. The degree of convergence and compatibility between EU and domestic 
policies is often conceptualised as ‘the goodness of fit’. When the distance between EU and state 
policies is low, adaptational pressure is low and ‘the goodness of fit’ is therefore high, and vice 
versa when the divergence between EU and national policies is high (ibid.; Radaelli 2003:44-46). 
This argument is very similar to those pointed out earlier proposed by Nelson and Winter and 
Rogers regarding evolutionary organisational change and the degree of compatibility between the 
innovation and the present way of doing things, respectively. ‘The goodness of fit’ argument thus 
echoes observations made in the general literature on diffusion and innovation. The ‘opportunity 
structure’ approach, on the other hand, points to more genuinely political arguments. 
Accordingly, Europeanisation can provide possible solutions in the national debate, alter 
expectations about the future, and thereby give domestic reformers the additional legitimacy 
needed to implement their otherwise controversial policies. In other words, Europeanisation can 
restructure strategic opportunities available to domestic actors (Nedergaard 2006:425; Radaelli 
2003:38,43; Haverland 2006:140). This restructuring can be considered as related to the changed 
opportunity structure which economists claim will be available to market actors as a result of 
technical innovations. Consequently, Europeanisation can be linked to the economic approach to 
innovation and diffusion theories involving rational calculations of political costs and benefits. 
  
Horizontal Europeanisation is taking place either directly through the diffusion of shared ideas 
and policy frameworks, or indirectly by the establishment of networks and institutional linkages. 
As argued by Trondal (2002:338), the links between EU and Norwegian institutions have grown, 
and policy reforms at the EU level can therefore be seen as leading to reform also in 
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corresponding national policies. Radaelli (2003:43) claims that the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) is the most important innovation among the means used for this kind of interaction and 
policy transfer. In short, the OMC involves agreeing on common goals for the Union. As these 
targets are not legally binding ones, it is left to each member-state to decide what strategies and 
means are to be used in order to reach the goals (St.mld. 2001-2002). The method is therefore also 
based on voluntary cooperation between the European states. The OMC mainly works through 
the mechanisms of learning from others, diffusion and ideational convergence as to what 
standards should be seen as appropriate, normative pressure making actors concerned about 
preserving their good reputation, and agenda setting (Gornitzka 2004:11-12). A similar strategy of 
diffusion of best practices and furthermore of technology, also has a long tradition in the field of 
innovation policy (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:27). Best practices can be seen as the results of 
policy discourses where preferences, expectations and ideas are displayed and debated. Discourse 
hereby becomes a prerequisite for the legitimisation of policy, and therefore for the diffusion of 
this policy as well as Europeanisation (Radaelli 2003:48-50; Nedergaard 2006:425). However, 
while this policy discourse and policy reforms can of course be geared towards actual action, it 
can sometimes only be meant as talk and symbolic signalling in order to create an image of 
political actors and decision-makers as vigorous, efficient, and in favour of changes, and not 
because the policy is actually wanted or needed. Similar trends can be observed in the innovation 
policy literature. Among others Hauknes and Wicken (2002:33-34) point out that “[p]olicy 
decisions influencing industrial development are made in many ministries and public agencies and 
there is no systematic co-ordination or attempt to analyse the consequences the various policy 
decisions have for industrialisation”. Consequently there is no guarantee that an effective 
innovation policy will be created. This may be seen as a result of innovation policies being 
favoured and endorsed on a broad, popular political basis. It can seem as though more emphasis 
is placed upon the actual policy decision favouring innovation policies, than upon its concrete 
content or outcome. 
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However, there are several problems and intervening variables related to both vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms of Europeanisation. When it comes to the ‘goodness of fit’ argument for 
instance, it is not valid for all cases of Europeanisation. Governments will change their behaviour 
and policy decisions not only as a result of adaptational pressure, but also because they have their 
own rational reasons for seeking domestic reform. In these cases, politicians will use European 
policy regulations as an opportunity to implement the same or similar regulations at home if this 
is favourable for their political objectives (Radaelli 2003:45-46). Also, the institutional capacity to 
produce and sustain change can intervene in the process of Europeanisation. This capacity 
depends among others on the number of veto points present in the decision-making system. The 
existence of a veto point can be said to involve the possibility for actors to reject a proposal and 
thereby block attempts at policy change. As seen from this, the Europeanisation process is highly 
influenced by the policy dimension of change (ibid.).  
 
Also, it is very important not only to adopt a top-down view on Europeanisation. The process 
involves more than just adaptational pressure from the EU level to member or non-member-state 
level. It is not simply a question of whether a state will or will not adopt EU policies. 
Europeanisation is also a response to domestic needs, priorities and developments. This bottom-
up approach sees the adoption of certain national policies as a response to the specific situation 
in and context of, a state (Radaelli 2003:50-51). Moreover, the coevolution of domestic and 
European structures should be closely considered (ibid.:52). 
 
In the next part of this thesis I will combine aspects from the theoretical perspectives of STS and 
Political Science in order to create a theory frame suitable for the following analysis of actors and 
arguments related to the adoption of the 3% target. 
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2.3 Combining theories – Combining main expectations 
In order to arrive at a theoretical framework adapted to the purpose of this thesis, the traits from 
the literature and theoretical approaches outlined above which I expect to be of important to my 
further research, will be combined. This combination of theories forms the basis of my 
assessment of why and how the EU’s objective to increase R&D expenditures to 3% of GDP has 
become a Norwegian policy goal, and what actors and arguments were involved in this process. 
During my literature review I pointed out which factors from the different perspectives on 
diffusion and innovation, organisational innovation, systems of innovation, regulatory and policy 
innovation and Europeanisation that are considered relevant for my research question. When 
seeking to categorise these factors which can all be seen as influencing the actors and underlying 
the arguments involved in the adoption of the 3% target, I see them as falling into three main 
groups. The first concerns rational choice, strategic behaviour, actors’ preferences and self-
interest. The second is related to institutions, networks, systems, coordination, and common rules 
and norms. The third contains learning and other cognitive processes, imitation, common 
understandings and ideas. These three groups correspond to an analytical approach used by 
scholars discussing international cooperation and integration and the significance thereof for 
national politics and policy. The three perspectives are then often referred to as interest-based, 
rule-based, and idea-based (Gornitzka and Langfeldt, forthcoming:170; Olsen 2002; Claes and 
Tranøy 1999:7-10,65; Trondal 2002).  
 
The three groups of factors are shown in the figure below, as is the theoretical context used to 
arrive at this categorisation. The process can briefly be described as follows: My point of 
departure was the perspectives on vertical and horizontal Europeanisation (Radaelli 2003) as 
outlined above. Horizontal Europeanisation takes place directly through diffusion of policies or 
indirectly through networks and institutions, while vertical Europeanisation mainly emanates 
from adaptational pressure and international regulatory competition. Drawing upon Nedergaard 
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(2006) as described earlier on, I divide vertical Europeanisation into a ‘compliance approach’ 
where adaptational pressure results from a misfit between policies at the EU and the national 
level, and an ‘opportunity approach’ involving rational choices and the restructuring of strategic 
opportunities. While the ‘compliance approach’ can be seen as involving idea-based arguments, 
the ‘opportunity approach’ entails interest-based claims. Horizontal Europeanisation, on the 
other hand, can be seen as rule-based. Finally, I consider the idea-based as well as the rule-based 
category to make up external factors, important for the process of Europeanisation. External 
factors influence domestic policy decisions without necessarily being a part of the national 
context, as shown by among others Hall (2005) and Black (2005a). The interest-based category 
on the other hand, can be considered as consisting of internal factors, directly involving national 
R&D actors in the process of Europeanisation (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure of theoretical framework for the assessment of the Europeanisation of Norwegian R&D policy 
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Before proceeding to a description of categories of rational choice and self-interest, institutions 
and networks, learning and imitation, and outline some hypothesis regarding each of them, I will 
briefly return to the concept of Europeanisation. Based upon the literature review, some 
arguments from the scholarly debate will be used to portray how Europeanisation is taking place 
also in the Norwegian R&D policy area.  
 
2.3.1 Europeanisation of Norwegian R&D policy 
The vast body of scholarly literature on Europeanisation would support the argument that these 
processes of integration and diffusion are important for national policies. Several publications 
also mention mechanisms of learning, strategic adaptation, and coordination as exercising major 
influence. There is strong evidence to support the claim that Europeanisation is indeed taking 
place in the European policy sphere.3 Furthermore, the process does not only influence EU 
member-states, but also non-members which interact closely with and depend on the Union in 
several policy areas, like Norway. Consequently, I expect that Europeanisation is a major factor 
contributing to the adoption of the 3% objective into Norwegian R&D policy, although there 
will always be a risk of so called analytical oversight. This means that there is a chance of not 
seeing that integration effects, and policy diffusion can in fact be a result of broader forces like 
globalisation in stead of Europeanisation (Anderson 2003:51).4 
 
In the debate about the degree and effects of Europeanisation it has also been assumed that “the 
degree of adaptational pressure is fairly strong in new EU member-states and in states that are 
                                                 
3 Among the scholars arguing that Europeanisation of national policies is taking place are Mörth (1998), Featherstone et al. 
(2003), Olsen (2002), Claes and Tranøy (2006), Trondal (2002). Although their conceptualisations of Europeanisation are not 
uniform, they are related to such an extent that I will treat them together. More specifically, however, I base my view of 
Europeanisation on Radaelli’s (2003:30) definition which is found earlier in the paper. 
4 This alerts on to the importance of critically examining ‘Europe’s’ role as the only source of domestic policy change. This 
argument is underlined by Trondal’s study which shows that Norwegian research and education policies seem to be more 
strongly affected by policies like those of the WTO and the Bologna declaration, than by EU adaptational pressure. However, 
there is no necessary contradiction between national policies being influenced by global policy trends and the adaptation to 
European policy objectives. Furthermore, the similarities between the thematic research priorities of the EU and the 
corresponding priorities of Norway, are increasing. In addition, research policies are argued to converge more easily towards 
EU standards than other policies (Trondal 2002:349). These are both trends which have important implications for my research 
question. 
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located at the institutional rim of the EU – like Norway” (Trondal 2002:338). This is to a great 
extent based on the fact that Norway’s participatory status in the EU through the EEA 
Agreement, resembles that of the member-states, at least within the field of research and 
education which is closely liked to R&D policies (EFTA 2005; St.mld. 2001-2002). Furthermore, 
Berry and Berry (1999) show how policy learning and diffusion are more likely to take place when 
the receiving country shares borders and political and economic conditions with the sending 
country, as is the case for the EU and Norway. EU regulations and governance will thus be of 
great relevance to Norwegian national policies. Trondal (2002:348) also points out that 
Norwegian policy makers and documents are directing increased attention towards emerging EU 
policies of research and education. The perceived policy differences as well as the willingness to 
learn, will influence the degree of policy transfer in this case. Studies show that there is little 
evidence of symbolic policy convergence and cheap talk in Norwegian research and education 
policies, which most likely means that there is an actual willingness and perceived need among 
politicians and other involved actors to adopt EU policies (ibid.:351). Furthermore, there are 
hypotheses arguing that the pressure for policy convergence is even stronger in Norway than in 
established EU member-states (ibid.:338). The following part and the discussion at the end of 
this paper will aim at the factors involved in the process of Europeanisation as well as the degree 
to which the different factors have contributed to the diffusion of policy from the European to 
the national level. 
 
2.3.2 Mechanisms of Europeanisation  
As already pointed out, Europeanisation is a complex phenomenon. However, in order to 
structure my discussion, the outline of the mechanisms influencing and contributing to 
Europeanisation has been simplified in line with the figure and the three main categories 
sketched out above. The categories are described in greater detail in the following. Also, I will 
outline some expectations regarding the actors and arguments involved in the adoption of the 3% 
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target into Norwegian R&D policy. These expectations involve assessments on what claims are 
likely to be made by the Norwegian actors in the adoption process, based on whether their 
arguments can be considered as deriving from an interest-, a rule-, or an idea-based perspective.  
 
Interest-based Europeanisation 
If the adoption of the 3% target into Norwegian policy is to be seen as interest-based 
Europeanisation, the decision would stem from rational calculations of costs and benefits, the 
relative advantage and improvement, and the degree of enhanced status expected from the 
implementation of such a goal. Actors’ interests and goals are often heavily involved, and 
consequently policy decisions can only be made after fierce negotiations where the outcome 
largely depends on resources inhabited by the different actors. According to such a perspective, 
the actors would use strategies and tactics in order to strengthen their own position in the 
relevant political arena relative to others (Rones 1995:165; Gornitzka and Langfeldt, 
forthcoming:170-171). These tendencies are characteristic of an interest-based perspective on 
Europeanisation. 
 
What arguments will be observed in the debate about the adoption of the 3% goal if Norwegian 
actors are seen as rational, strategic and self-interested? In general, it first has to be considered 
whether the EU policy decision in question will affect Norwegian interests. If not, national policy 
actors do not necessarily react to it. If the decision affects national interests but does not conflict 
with domestic policies already in place, Norwegian authorities are likely to adjust to the Union’s 
decision. However, if the EU policy decision is not compatible with Norwegian policies, the 
Government will have to take action. In this case, there are alternative rational reactions available.  
Norwegian actors can choose to disregard the policy decision, they can enter into negotiations 
trying to gain leverage and thereby an exception from the unacceptable parts of the EU decision, 
they can try to influence the EU policy to further changes favourable from a national point of 
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view, or the Norwegian Government can decide to veto the EU policy decision. (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004:186-187; Feragen 2005:30)  
 
However, the 3% policy objective is not legally binding for Norway, nor for any of the EU 
member-states, and consequently the costs involved in non-adoption are not legal but potential 
social sanctions. Furthermore, the EU’s 3% goal can not be seen as a contradiction, but rather an 
addition to already existing Norwegian R&D policy. As a result, it is likely to affect the national 
interests in a non-conflicting way. Reaching the OECD average 2,3% spending on R&D by 2005 
is already a national policy goal, and the extension of this numeric goal to 3%, can seem a small 
and not very controversial policy alteration. Nevertheless, presumably several Norwegian policy 
actors adopted an interest-based perspective when considering the costs and benefits of adopting 
the 3% target. Actors interested in increasing expenditures for R&D can have pointed out how it 
would be necessary for Norway to adopt the 3% goal in order to follow European trends and 
standards for R&D. Furthermore, increased research activities were likely to create positive 
externalities for society as a whole. Emphasis on how benefits of adopting the 3% target would 
outweigh the costs, can therefore be expected to figure prominently in the debate about the 
policy adoption. One may also assume that rationalists mechanisms of shaming (Trondal 
2002:337), setting the Norwegian Government in a bad light if it did not increase its R&D 
expenditures, have been used. 
 
Rule-based Europeanisation 
The importation of the EU’s 3% objective can also be seen as determined by the national 
institutional R&D environment. In this case the adoption of the goal will be dependent on rules, 
procedures and trends of institutions within the area of R&D policy. These institutions both act 
restrictive on the actors behaviour as well as providing meeting points where networking 
activities can take place and ideas be discussed. Furthermore, networks, systems and institutions 
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which the actors take part in, give meaning to the environment and regulate cooperation, 
dependency and power. Consequently, these institutions can have a role of their own in the 
process of policy formation (Feragen 2005:32-33). Compared to the rational and strategic choice 
perspective described above, the interests of actors are considered of secondary importance to 
policy decisions according to this institution-based view (Olsen 1992:250). The importance of 
belonging to a system or a network of actors, be they involved in innovation as within the SI 
approach described above or with different policy fields such as in the European Union, is seen 
as vital. Actors will therefore often adapt their behaviour to fit the overall system framework 
instead of acting out of shear self-interest. According to a rule-based perspective, it can be 
expected that actors involved in adopting the 3% objective would argue in favour of such a goal 
because Norway is a party to the EEA Agreement and already cooperates with the EU in several 
important policy fields. Thereby it becomes important also for Norwegian R&D actors to 
produce policy decisions in line with the broader EU values, visions and objectives. (Gornitzka 
and Langfeldt, forthcoming:171) 
 
I expect arguments about the importance of networking, systems of innovation and R&D, 
institutions and common rules to have figured prominently among the actors involved in the 
process of transferring the 3% goal into Norwegian policy context. Norway’s main relation to the 
EU is regulated through the EEA Agreement covering several policy fields. Consequently, 
Norwegian laws and regulations must be adjusted to changes made in the EU directives included 
in this agreement as these are legally binding and international law has priority over national law. 
Since Norway is not a member of the EU, the country is not participating in the decision-making 
processes potentially leading to alterations in the EEA Agreement (St.mld. 2005-2006). 
Nevertheless, studies show that Norway in total has adopted and integrated as many as 5300 legal 
acts from the EU (ibid.). Importing the 3% goal is one such example of voluntary policy 
adoption as this is an objective which is not legally binding within the EEA and neither in the 
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EU. The EU and the EEA can be considered Norway’s most important and relevant 
international policy networks. The fact that Norway to such a large extent adopts EU regulations 
only adds to this argument and shows the great coherency between Norwegian and EU policy 
institutions and rules. I therefore expect national R&D actors to use arguments regarding the 
importance of close relations with the EU through the EEA but also through other means, in 
order to show the benefits of the 3% target in a national context. Also, I expect the actors to 
claim that Norway is already to such a large extent integrated in the European Unions R&D 
activities through the Framework Programs, the effort to establish ERA and other joint research 
projects, that it would only be reasonable also to adopt the numeric objective from the Barcelona 
meeting into national policies. 
 
Idea-based Europeanisation 
Transfer of the 3% goal into Norwegian policies can also be considered a result of cognitive 
processes, learning or imitation, and inspiration from new ideas in the R&D policy area. A 
common understanding of problem-solving and political solutions will often result from arenas 
available for political debates, and these factors can be crucial for successful decision-making. 
Consequently, it is possible for actors to alter their opinions and preferences following a 
discussion, and moreover opinions may change depending on the situation and time (Claes and 
Tranøy 1999:7). In line with one strand of argumentation within this approach, the adoption of 
the 3% target can be the result of actors viewing what is often described as low Norwegian R&D 
expenditures and innovativeness as a national problem, and consequently the EU R&D goal as a 
very attractive one (Claes and Tranøy 1999:10). 
 
I expect learning, imitation and idea-based arguments to have played a major role among actors 
arguing in favour of including the 3% goal in national R&D policies. Learning from EU’s best 
practices can result from the opinion that national policies are insufficient or unsatisfactory 
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means for reaching vital national goals. Moreover, if the Union’s policy goals are viewed as more 
vigorous, effective and future oriented, the willingness to learn from and imitate them in the 
domestic policies, will increase. Consequently, Norwegian policy actors can be expected to have 
used both problem-based and solution-oriented argumentation when favouring the adoption of 
the 3% goal. The Norwegian economy is often portrayed as not being innovative enough and 
one lacking research efforts (OECD 2007). As a result, the Barcelona objective can be seen by 
policy actors as the solution to these problems. On the other hand, as already argued, practises 
adopted within the EU are often considered as pointing out general trends and prominent ideas 
in the international society which should be imitated or learned from in order to keep up with 
broader, global developments. Furthermore, mechanisms of idea-based Europeanisation can be 
said to be at work, if I am able to identify a conviction among Norwegian actors favouring the 
adoption of the 3% target, that this is a goal which fits the Norwegian context, just as it fits the 
general European one.  
 
The Norwegian Government closely surveys the development within, and the actions taken by, 
the European Union because, as already argued, most EU policy decisions influence Norwegian 
policies. It is even assumed that countries outside the EU, such as Norway, face stronger pressure 
for adaptation to the Union’s policies than do member-states (Trondal 2002:338). This also 
results from the fact that the Norwegian policy sphere is closely connected to the European one 
as Norwegian interests, institutions, values and ideas largely coincide with those of the EU. 
Consequently, transfer of EU policies can be seen to happen in all areas, including R&D policies 
(Gornitzka and Langfeldt, forthcoming:197-198). Consequently, the Government and other 
affected domestic actors will try to foresee how the Union will react and act in different situations 
in order to make an assessment of how this will affect their own position.  
 
 
34 
   
I will bring with me my outlined expectations, based on theoretical strands and traits, to my more 
thorough analysis of the arguments of the various actors in Norwegian R&D policies in Chapter 
4 of this thesis. Based on articles, reports, interviews performed by others, as well as personal 
correspondence per e-mail expressing these actors’ views, I will assess whether the theoretical 
basis of their claims, as outlined above, is in fact confirmed. First, however, I will give an 
overview over methods and data used, and the criteria upon which I have based my choices of 
theory.  
 
2.4 Research methods, choice of theory and data 
2.4.1 Qualitative research method 
When using a qualitative research method, the analysing and collecting of data material is done in 
parallel sessions. Consequently, the data can be reassessed as new and surprising results may 
appear underway, or as new data material found is included in the analysis (Hellevik 1999:196). It 
may be argued that this method gives a deeper and more accessible understanding of the 
processes or objects studied (ibid.:13). The thesis is based upon a qualitative research method. It 
includes a case study and the tracing of the process leading to the adoption of the EU 3% goal 
into Norwegian R&D policy, and consequently allows for great focus upon actors and arguments 
and the underlying motivations, ideas, goals and preferences. The main research method is that of 
of major policy documents, articles and reports. In cases where the different documents did not 
provide satisfying answers, I have to a limited but important extent included correspondence 
with persons crucial for the policy formulation process such as politicians, employees in the 
ministries and other actors important for R&D policies, in the data material. 
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2.4.2 Case study 
A case study is an intensive study of one single case which builds its data collection and analysis 
on existing theory (ibid.:97; Yin 2003:14). My case involves the tracing of policy actors and 
arguments involved in the process of transferring the 3% goal from the EU level into the 
domestic R&D policy field. By combining traits from several theoretical perspectives I try to 
assess and understand the process of Europeanisation of Norwegian R&D policies.  
 
2.4.3 Data material and questions of validity and reliability 
My data material can broadly be divided into two parts, one more theoretical and one more 
empirical one. The former consists of major publications in the field of STS, studies of 
innovation, and literature on perspectives and approaches of political science. The latter part is 
mostly made up of policy documents and papers published both by the OECD, major EU 
institutions, the Norwegian Government, including the different ministries and their employees, 
the Research Council of Norway (RCN), the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), 
research institutes such as NIFU STEP5, and individual researchers and other individual actors in 
the field of R&D policy. 
 
The validity of data is a question of how relevant the data material is when assessed against the 
research question posed (Hellevik 1999:183). In other words, it concerns the degree to which 
what is intended to be measured, is actually measured. As argued by Yin (2003:98), triangulation, 
that is the use of multiple sources of evidence, can lead to a higher validity and more accurate 
research results. As mentioned, I have conveyed different written sources and a variety of 
statistics. Also, as the theories used have traits which both complement and reinforce each others 
                                                 
5NIFU STEP, Norsk institutt for studier av forskning og utdanning. Senter for innovasjonsforskning, The Norwegian institute for 
research and educational studies. Centre for research on innovation (my translation). 
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assessment on policy diffusion from the EU to the national level, they can be argued to add 
validity to the results of my case study. 
  
For the data to be valid it also has to be reliable, that is, it has to have a high degree of accuracy 
and consistency and be carefully collected. It may generally be hard to attain a high degree of 
reliability when using qualitative research method because it will always involve a certain extent of 
estimations, personal assessments and considerations (Hellevik 1999:53-54). This is the case also 
for the conclusions drawn from my thesis. However, I have added a complete list of literature 
and references which should enable the reader to check all the sources which this research and its 
conclusions are based on. This should at least to some extent increase the reliability (Yin 2003: 
34). 
  
When dealing with questions of validity and reliability, it is vital to consider the type of literature 
used, that is, if the literature sources are primary or secondary. A primary source is an original 
document containing firsthand information about a topic. Examples are interviews, most policy 
papers and statistics. These can be said to have a great degree of reliability. Journal articles are 
examples of secondary sources as these contain interpretations and a commentary or discussion 
of a primary source (Hellevik 1999:101-102). I have based the empirical part of my thesis on 
primary sources in order to increase the reliability of my research results. Consequently, I have 
used several documents called ‘public’, such as publications by the Government. Despite this 
public status, however, it is important to assess these documents in a critical way as their contents 
are often political and therefore most probably contain general as well as popular statements and 
promises. It is necessary to be aware of the great gap often existing between words and deeds in 
politics (Ugur et al. 2006:238). 
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2.4.4 Limitations 
There are several limitations involved when performing a case study, and several of these concern 
the research method and the collection of data material. The first limitation concerns the 
difficulties with generalising from my case study of Europeanisation in the field of R&D policy, 
to the broader processes of policy formation and diffusion. These difficulties arise because, by 
conducting only one case study, it will hardly be possible to determine whether the conclusions 
drawn are valid only in the context of this study, or will be valid also for some or all similar cases 
(Andersen 2003:132-135). However, I believe that my qualitative approach will add some 
perspectives to the research results which would be lost in a quantitative analysis which, on the 
other hand, this would allow for several case studies. 
 
In order to secure precise and more detailed information vital for the understanding of the 
research question, some of the actors considered important for the adoption of the 3% target 
were contacted per e-mail. Some problems occurred when trying to reach the interviewees as 
some did neither respond to the e-mails nor return my phone calls. However, I will argue that 
those actually replying were among the most relevant actors in the political context at the time 
the EU goal was adopted, and that this relevance weighs up for the smaller number of interviews 
carried out.  
 
Furthermore, including an even greater amount of literature would have added to the depth and 
scope of the study. This has first and foremost been a question of having enough time to read a 
larger amount of all the literature available concerning the theoretical, practical and political 
aspects of my research topic. More time would also have allowed me to do a more systematic 
assessment of literature and consequently of the process of Europeanisation, the research 
question, the case study, and its implications. As the time schedule for this thesis is rather tight I 
have tried to select the most relevant publications, and I will argue that I have managed to 
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include a quite large amount of actors and arguments in the case study and the discussion related 
to it. Concerning the different actors, I have concentrated less discerning the different strands of 
each actor’s claims and points of view, and more on portraying a greater variety of actors and 
their main arguments in the process of introducing the 3% target into Norwegian R&D policies.  
 
It may also be seen as problematic to base a study to such a large extent on theoretical analysis. 
As theories are ideal pictures or models of how the world works, or is supposed to work, it can 
sometimes be difficult to see the relation between a case study and the wider theoretical 
perspective or framework. Also, it is important not only to comment on the instances where the 
theory fits practice, but also admit and point out when there is a misfit and maybe even suggest 
an alternative theoretical explanation to the new development or instance revealed and 
experienced. My effort to avoid these pitfalls involves choosing those traits from variety of 
theoretical approaches which I see as most suitable for my case study, and combine them in 
order to gain a better understanding of the Europeanisation of Norwegian R&D policy. 
 
The following chapter will be concerned with the topic of R&D and, moreover, the formation 
and development of R&D policies both in international arenas like the OECD and the EU, and 
in a Norwegian national arena. This can be seen as important in order to understand the context 
in which the 3% target was adopted by Norwegian R&D actors. 
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3. R&D policy - why national and European policy for 
R&D? 
3.1 What is R&D? 
The document ‘Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development’, also 
known as the Frascati Manual, was created in the context of the OECD in 1963. In the Manual it 
is argued that  
 
[t]he basic criterion for distinguishing R&D from related activities is the presence in R&D of an appreciable 
element of novelty and the resolution of scientific and/or technological uncertainty, i.e. when the solution to a 
problem is not readily apparent to someone familiar with the basic stock of commonly used knowledge and 
techniques in the area concerned. 
(OECD 2002a:33) 
 
When elaborating on this conception of R&D, it can be described as a systematisation of creative 
work. Furthermore, its objective can be seen as the process of increasing and improving the stock 
of knowledge in e.g. a firm, an industry or a society, and then using this new knowledge to devise 
new applications. Although this may seem a rather broad and all encompassing definition of 
R&D, it allows for the distinction between R&D and similar activities like education, training, 
market research, and industrial activities related to acquisition of products and licenses (Smith 
2005:154). A slightly different definition focusing more on the economic parts of the R&D 
process, is put forward by Edquist (2005:190) arguing that R&D can create a base for innovations 
through the development of economically relevant knowledge. Thus, research and development 
can provide the financing of the commercialisation of such knowledge, that is, its transformation 
into innovations. Together, these characteristics form a picture of the R&D process which gives a 
satisfactory description for the purpose of my thesis. 
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3.2 R&D Policy - The need for a separate policy field for 
research and development 
The very initial activities related to science, research and technology were the result of human 
curiosity and a need to solve problems faced and meet new challenges arising. At all times we 
have searched for new knowledge, and this has resulted in a process of development on a 
personal as well as on a societal and economic level. The history of R&D activities is a long one. 
Nevertheless, the following paragraphs will be concerned with the way from the initial concepts 
of research and development to the separate field of R&D policy which w attach so much 
importance to today.  
 
Early theorists of economics, including Marx, Harrod, Domar, Kaldor, Solow and Arrow 
(Fagerberg 2002:98) solely emphasised the importance of capital accumulation as a factor leading 
to growth. They were very sceptical towards the view that innovation and research were causally 
related to economic growth. Schumpeter was one of the forerunners in bringing attention to the 
qualitative driving forces of growth when he claimed that economic development is “a process of 
qualitative change, driven by innovation, taking place in historical time” (Schumpeter in 
Fagerberg 2005:6). However, the real breakthrough of the idea of innovation and R&D as driving 
forces of economic development, did not come until after World War II, not least as a result of 
the Minerva-debate (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:14). This was also the point when the importance 
of research and development, and policies related to these activities, was generally accepted. Not 
only was this view of R&D one widely agreed upon by politicians, but it also became an area 
given high priority on the OECD agenda, one of the major international organisational actors of 
the time (Skoie 2005:23). Several conditions lead to the awakening of R&D as a separate policy 
field. As pointed out by Hans Skoie (ibid.:11), both national and international investments into 
R&D were increasing and gaining legitimacy among policy actors. This was not least because the 
war had shown how research and technology were crucial in order to create new jobs, improve 
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peoples’ health and increase living standards (Bush 1945). Furthermore, the Cold War and the 
arms and space race which developed between the USA and the Soviet Union after 1945 
emphasised even further the crucial position held by R&D as a means to enhance national as well 
as international security. However, the arguments which might have gained the widest acceptance 
in society were those concerning the possibilities of increasing economic growth and welfare. 
 
Consequently, the first few decades following the war showed an almost exclusive focus on the 
economic benefits of innovation and R&D activities.6 As analysis follows reality and empirical 
research, the new trends lead to a revision of several theories and models on economic and 
technological development. Bell (1999) writes in length about the coming of the post-industrial 
knowledge society. He claims that technology has been one of the main driving forces from the 
past to this current knowledge-based society. Also, he points out how economic innovation and 
change are directly dependent upon new technology. Laestadius (2003) claims that acts of 
research and discovery underpin innovation which furthers economic development and growth. 
Other scholars such as Galbraith, Goodwin and Hirschman have followed up and modernised 
the Schumpeterian ideas concerning the relationship between innovation and economic 
productivity. Economists like Romer and Grossman have contributed to the development of 
what is called New Growth Theory. This is only one, though one of the most influential, theories 
that tries to explain the forces driving the increase in long-term economic productivity (OECD 
1996a:11). New Growth Theory explores the relationship between the traditional and the new, 
knowledge-based economic perspectives. More specifically, it points to the importance of factors 
such as investment in R&D, education and training, and new managerial work structures for 
economic development (ibid.:3,7). Fagerberg (2002:93) refers to Romer’s second framework for 
growth theory which explains how innovations contribute to the advance of scientific and 
technological knowledge and thereby improve society’s capability to produce new innovations in 
                                                 
6 See among others Fagerberg et al. (2005) and Bell (1999). 
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the future. This continuous improvement in innovation capability prevents decreasing and indeed 
leads to increasing returns on investments into R&D. As a result, long-run economic growth can 
be explained by imperfect competition which enables companies to make profits from their R&D 
investments, combined with spillovers from these investments to society’s knowledge base and 
its capability to continue with innovative activities in the future (ibid.:93-97).  
 
As a result of the increasing interest in and importance of innovation and R&D as both 
furthering growth and increasing society’s knowledge base, policy in these areas has become a 
more and more important issue on the domestic policy agenda (ibid.:94). Arguments in justifying 
research and development efforts and activities are therefore also to a much larger extent guided 
by broader societal needs as compared to simply economic ones. And it is among these societal 
arguments in favour of increasing the focus upon, and investments into, research and 
development, that most of the answers to why there should be a separate policy field concerned 
with R&D, are found. Society is in a process of continuous change and development. 
Consequently, we face challenges, and in order to meet these challenges we need new insights 
based on scientific research and new knowledge. The creation and attainment of new knowledge 
through R&D activities becomes, therefore, crucial. R&D spurs critical thinking and better 
solutions. Also, investments into research and development are profitable, both in a business and 
a society perspective. As a result, several countries have set as their goal to increase the R&D 
effort to ensure future profits and value added (St.mld. 2004-2005:7-9). The increased exchange of 
knowledge and know-how across borders is only one trait in this development. 
 
The OECD, the European Union, and also the national Norwegian Government, have all 
recognised the need for increased investment into R&D. This investment is partly seen as the 
responsibility of the whole of society as its scientific results will be a public good, i.e. something 
that benefits all members of society rather than selective groups. However, those gaining the 
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greatest benefits from R&D activities are those firms and businesses which can apply the R&D 
results directly in their production of goods or services and thereby enhance their revenues. 
Therefore not only governments but also private firms and enterprises, should grant money to 
research or engage in R&D activities themselves (Dickson 2005:1).  
 
Already, there is a multitude of institutions engaged in R&D. Firms, research centres, universities 
and other institutions of higher education, as well as enterprises all interact with science and 
technology in some way. As most of these different institutions operate under different rules, 
laws and regulations, all governments wanting to increase the social and economic gains from 
science and technology will have to ensure that there nevertheless exists some degree of 
coherency between the different institutions. As Dickson (ibid.:2) points out, “[t]his usually 
means establishing a single framework for the rules, laws and decisions that have an important 
influence on [R&D]. In other words, creating an R&D policy.” 
 
Hence, today not only researchers themselves and research institutions are concerned with R&D 
activities. Governments, political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and private 
firms and investors see ever more clearly the correlation between R&D on the one hand, and 
societal gains and creation of public goods on the other. Consequently, methods for measuring 
R&D are needed as the results of these activities have to be easily assessable, not only by the 
researchers performing R&D but also by those persons and interest groups potentially benefiting 
from it. 
 
3.2.1 Measuring R&D 
“Measurement implies commensurability” (Smith 2005:149). 
For a long time it was claimed that innovation was impossible to quantify and therefore also 
impossible to measure. Today, however, there are several indicators for inputs and outputs of 
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innovation, and R&D efforts and expenditures. While many of these are sector specific, some are 
also economy-wide and therefore especially well suited for cross-country and larger international 
studies (ibid.:148).  
 
The first attempts to measure the effort and results of science by relating R&D expenditures to 
national income, were conducted in England by Bernal in the 1930s. Through his work he 
became strongly convinced that increasing the R&D effort would lead to economic growth and 
welfare. In 1945, the internationally known Vannevar Bush report ‘Science The Endless Frontier’, 
stated that investments into science could have large, positive impacts both on the economy and 
welfare (Bush 1945). In the late 1950s-60s Christopher Freeman played a vital role in developing 
the analytical basis of science, technology and innovation policy. His contribution to the OECD 
Frascati Manual of 1963, which enabled national authorities to measure R&D and compare the 
R&D effort across countries, was among his most important achievements (Lundvall and Borrás 
2005:604-605,616). As this Manual has been continuously modified through the years, it is still 
the key OECD document on the collection of R&D statistics (Smith 2005:153). The Manual also 
provides a definition of R&D. And although this definition is not totally watertight it makes it 
possible to draw a line between R&D and related activities, thereby distinguishing activities which 
should be measured when looking for changes in R&D efforts from those which should not.  
 
One of the indicators most commonly used when measuring the amount of research and 
development conducted, is “R&D intensity” which is the ratio of R&D expenditure to some 
measure of output. On country level, this is usually the ratio of gross expenditures on R&D to 
the Gross Domestic Product (GERD/GDP). The ratio of R&D to GDP can be used to 
characterise industries, and a high ratio is said to signify that the business is involved in high-tech 
activities. Similarly, a country with a high ratio of gross expenditure on R&D to GDP is seen as 
an innovative, knowledge creating, and technological progressive one (ibid.:155). The OECD was 
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among the first international organisations collecting data on GERD/GDP ratios to create 
statistics showing the distribution of R&D intensities across countries. This is probably also the 
reason why the OECD average for GERD/GDP was long treated as a goal which all advanced 
countries were trying to approach. Also Norway had until 2005 the OECD average as its 
objective for national expenditures on R&D. 
 
Measuring R&D is of great importance not only for researchers conducting the actual R&D, but 
also for those actors depending on the effects of such activities. Among others, R&D policy 
actors need indicators telling them whether their actions of promoting or discouraging R&D 
have been successful. Furthermore, comprehensive measuring methods are crucial in order to 
assess whether and how policy can be used to extract the desired results from R&D. 
Consequently, the methods for measuring R&D have implications for this study of the 
Europeanisation of Norwegian R&D policy as national policy actors will be interested in 
measuring how the implementation of European R&D objectives affect national R&D efforts. 
 
3.3 The international dimension of R&D policy – the OECD 
and the EU 
3.3.1 Research and development policy and the role of the OECD 
The OECD has been the major actor among international organisations when it comes to the 
diffusion of ideas about innovation policy. In addition to having a vital role in the evolution of 
the understanding of science policy, technology policy, and innovation policy, the organisation 
has contributed to the merging of these three policy fields into one single perspective of science, 
technology, and innovation (STI) policy. This field has close links to that of R&D policy as 
research and development can be said to have their background in the scientification of 
innovation (Smith 2005:150). Consequently, the OECD is one of the best sources of 
internationally comparable data on science, technology and innovation. Following the policy 
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discourse in the organisation is of great interest to most actors and stakeholders in the area of 
R&D policy as it reflects new ideas and developments likely to shape future decisions and 
outcomes of policy discourses. The following phases can be said to characterise the development 
of the OECD’s R&D policy (OECD; Lundvall and Borrás 2005:603). 
  
The Pigagnol Report published by the OECD in the early 1960s strengthened the link between 
technological development and economic growth and stressed the need for national and rational 
planning of R&D investments. Moreover, the importance of more systematically gathered and 
measured data on R&D and the possibilities of formulating more systematic policy, were seen as 
interlinked. The Frascati Manual published later that decade, set out standards for internationally 
comparable measures of scientific and technological activities relevant to policy making. Both the 
Manual and the Report, increased the legitimacy of R&D policy. This is an example of how 
international organisations can function as teachers of norms, a view prominent in constructivist 
theories. Finnemore (1993) points out how international organisations can constitute examples 
for states and show states the value of policy organisations as well as encourage them to take part 
in policy coordination, for instance in the field of science policy. The world economy experienced 
a slump in the 1970s, and a rise in expenditures for science and R&D was seen as one measure to 
solve the problems. Furthermore, the OECD report ‘Technical Change and Economic Policy’ 
from 1980 directed the attention to diffusion of policy, important for society’s capacity to absorb 
new technology.  
 
An OECD report from 1990 emphasised national innovation systems, network formation, and 
the importance of improving the absorptive capacity of firms in order to ease their adaptation to 
a changing environment (Lundvall and Borrás 2005:603). In the latter half of the decade came the 
first Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard which gathered the latest internationally 
comparable data on economic trends. The indicators used, captured the changing relationship 
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between science, innovation and the economy, argued to be vital for policy makers and their 
ability to measure and evaluate their country’s performance relative to others. Furthermore, the 
Scoreboard stressed the importance of investment in knowledge as this would lead to scientific 
and technological innovations which were important drivers of economic growth, industrial 
competitiveness and realisation of societal objectives. (OECD 2001) Increasing R&D 
investments is a vital part of creating a knowledge-based society. And the ability of policy makers 
to find new methods to improve creation, absorption, diffusion and application of knowledge, is 
seen as an intrinsic part of this process (OECD 2002b).  
 
3.3.2 Research and development policy and the role of the EU 
While the OECD for a long time was almost the only international organisational actor in the 
field of R&D policy, the European Union is today challenging and to a large extent taking over 
the OECD’s lead in this area. This is not least because of the Union’s broader focus, considering 
R&D efforts not only from an economic and a growth perspective, but to a larger extent 
including political and social arguments to justify and speak in favour of increased investments 
into research and development activities. Also, as the international society has recognised the 
importance of both gaining and creating new knowledge, the EU has become aware of the need 
to manage research more proactively and coherently. If Europe as an actor in the global economy 
as well as in the international society is going to keep up with its main competitors, the U.S. and 
Japan, it has to drastically speed up its knowledge production (Busquin 2002). Today, the EU 
overall research effort represented 1,96% of GDP compared to 3.12% for Japan and 2,59% for 
the USA (European Commission 2007b). However, the process from the first efforts to set 
research and development issues on the EU agenda to arriving at the suggestion of creating a 
common European Research Area, has not been a straightforward one. Rather, as for the 
OECD, it can be described as having developed through different stages. 
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The Treaty of Nice ratified in December 2000 stipulates that “the Community and the Member 
States shall coordinate their research and technological development activities so as to ensure that 
national policies and Community policy are mutually consistent” (European Union 2006:122). 
However, the focus on integrating research and development policy within the EU was 
established well before this. Already in 1965 a committee made recommendations for areas of 
joint actions as well as methods for comparing and coordinating national research policies. This 
effort was followed up by the creation of the Directorate General for Research in 1973 and the 
Committee on Science and Technical Research (CREST) the year after. Moreover, in 1984 the 
EU launched its first Framework Program for research. These four year programs contributed 
strongly to the coordination of research policies as well as the strengthening of Europe’s 
industrial basis. The legitimacy of European integration in the field of R&D was further increased 
by the Treaty of Maastricht stating that “[t]he Community shall have the objective of 
strengthening the scientific and technological bases of Community industry and encourage in to 
become more competitive at international level” (1992:Article 130f(1)). Nevertheless, the road 
towards a fully coordinated R&D policy within the European Community has been and to some 
extent still is, full of twists and turns. The European integration effort itself has experienced 
periods of stagnation, not least because of difficulties caused by low economic growth, 
unemployment and social problems like poverty. Furthermore, broader, more global trends and 
developments, such as the economic recessions of the 1970s and 80s, the increasing globalisation, 
and the growing importance of information and communication technologies, have influenced 
the possibilities for cooperation in the field of R&D within the EU (St.mld. 2001-2002).  
 
However, the initiative in January 2000 to create a European Research Area (ERA), brought the 
issue of policy coordination back on the daily political agenda of the Union. The idea of ERA 
was put forward as a result of the realisation that “research in Europe suffers from three 
weaknesses: insufficient funding, lack of an environment to stimulate research and exploit results, 
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and the fragmented nature of activities and the dispersal of resources” (CORDIS 2007a). 
Moreover, ERA was expected to result in a greater impact of national initiatives through 
multilateral efforts, more efficient use of resources, and therefore added value for the member-
states. The vitality of achieving a European Research Area was further emphasised at the Lisbon 
Summit in March 2000. There, the Heads of States and of Governments agreed that “EU shall in 
the next ten years be turned into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion” (European Parliament 2000). Although the research policy is one of those areas 
which has not yet been specifically and legally coordinated by the EU, the Lisbon Meeting was an 
important step in the direction of such coordination (Skoie 2005:249). The endorsement of the 
concept and ideas of ERA, can be seen as the next step in this policy coordination effort. The 
European Commission’s Green Paper published on the topic states that ERA is now a major 
reference for research policy in Europe, although there are still vital challenges that must be 
overcome in order to create, implement and reach full integration also in this policy field 
(European Commission 2007a:2).  
 
One of the follow ups to the Lisbon meeting, the Barcelona summit in 2002, was an effort to 
both widen and deepen R&D policy integration. In order to make the policy goals more concrete 
and also measurable, the participants at the summit proposed to increase the EU’s global research 
expenditures from less than 2% to 3% of GDP by 2010 (Busquin 2002). The objective especially 
aims at encouraging private investments. These should make up 2/3 of the 3% while the last 1/3 
should be public expenditures. The 3% goal was set to further increase employment, knowledge 
and competence in society, as well as macro economic stability (St.mld. 2001-2002).  
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4. Norway and the 3% decision 
In this chapter I will first give a short description of today’s Norwegian Research system. I 
believe this will add to the understanding of national R&D policy history which will be described 
in the second paragraph. The main objective of this chapter is to show how Norway’s activities in 
the area of R&D have changed through the decades after World War II, and how this 
development has resulted first in the goal of reaching the OECD average of R&D expenditures, 
and then in the adoption of the EU 3% goal for R&D. Furthermore, I will show what actors, 
arguments and mechanisms of Europeanisation have been involved in the case of the transfer of 
this 3% objective into national policies. The chapter’s final paragraphs will deal with how the 3% 
goal is handled in everyday political life in Norway and a discussion of today’s scenario in the 
field of R&D related to this goal. 
 
4.1 Short description of the Norwegian research system 
The current R&D policy in Norway is founded on the Government’s White Paper on research, 
Vilje til forskning,7 presented in spring 2005. Main topics in this document are international 
cooperation in the field of R&D policy, the importance of the quality of research, innovation, 
and ethical considerations related to R&D (St.mld. 2004-2005:3-5).  
 
The Norwegian research system can be divided into three different, although highly connected, 
levels: the political, the strategic and the performing level (Klitkou et al. 2005:5). The political 
level, the Storting and the ministries, sets out the main objectives for the Norwegian research and 
development policies. While today’s Education and Research has an overall responsibility for 
policies concerning R&D and acts as a supervisor of the formulation, implementation, 
coordination and financing of these policies, each ministry has a special interest in and therefore 
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also a special responsibility for, research in its respective area (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:16; 
Klitkou et al. 2005:6). The main actor on the strategic level is the Research Council of Norway. It 
is entitled to fund research, formulate policy and act as a government advisor in R&D policy 
issues, thereby forming a link between the political and the performing level. Finally, the 
performing level is often divided into the industry sector, the institute sector and the higher 
education sector. The first sector accounts for nearly half of Norway’s R&D expenditures and 
mostly consists of industries based on raw materials. The second sector accounts for slightly 
more than 40% of the total national R&D investments, while more than 25% of Norwegian 
research take place in the sector of higher education, mainly within universities (Klitkou et al. 
2005:6-7). With this basic structure in mind I will now give an overview of the history of 
Norwegian R&D policy which forms the background to the three level system just described. 
 
4.2 The history of Norwegian R&D policy 
After World War II it was necessary to revive national science, technology and research activities 
also in Norway. There was broad political agreement that domestic R&D activities should be 
prioritised, and a separate research sector was established. Political parties, the Government and 
its institutions, major firms and enterprise, research laboratories, and individual engineers and 
researchers were among the actors favouring this policy. It was seen as important to participate in 
the international technical and scientific development to build a modern state, to increase R&D 
investments and efforts to create economic and welfare benefits, to enhance the sustainability of 
the Norwegian regions, and develop national research institutions and universities. For a small 
country like Norway, research cooperation across national industry sectors was important. And as 
seen among others in the oil and gas sector, foreign expertise was a crucial source of knowledge 
for the rebuilding of Norway’s R&D sector. Both experience gained by individuals spending time 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 ‘Commitment to Research’ (translation from the home page of Trend Chart. Innovation Policy in Europe, available at: 
http://www.trendchart.org/tc_country_list.cfm?ID=14). 
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abroad during the war, as well as the direct import of foreign technology and knowledge, played a 
vital role (Skoie 2005:25-27,31). 
 
The increased willingness to invest into R&D activities was among others reflected by the 
establishment of research councils for several different disciplines during the first two post-war 
decades. Through these councils, public authorities were to a larger extent included in the 
financing of Norwegian R&D. And although this method of granting money was a more indirect 
one, the results were not necessarily less effective (Skoie 2005:30). Research was also treated 
specifically in the Governments long-term program set up in 1953 (St.mld. 1953). It stressed that 
Norway’s R&D effort should focus on areas of national interest, areas seen as important and as 
creating possibilities for domestic industries, and areas where research carried out in other 
countries was not satisfactory. However, emphasis was also put on taking advantage of 
international research results and innovations by adapting them to, or diffusing them into, a 
Norwegian context (Skoie 2005:30). This strategy of diffusion of technology, best practices and 
R&D gained political legitimacy from the late 1980s onwards (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:20). 
 
A question which was on the agenda in several countries in the post-war period, was whether 
public R&D should be considered as a policy field demanding separate treatment and therefore 
ought to be coordinated within its own ministry. The alternative view favoured a decentralisation 
of R&D policy, making it the concern of the different sectors of society and the corresponding 
government ministries.8 In Norway, especially the decision about whether or not to establish a 
separate ministry for R&D, provoked fierce debate (Skoie 2005:32-33,43). The degree of 
independence of R&D policies in Norway has varied through the years, however the 
decentralised alternative has been most common solution (ibid.:58-60). 
 
                                                 
8 For a more thorough overview and description of the different strands of arguments in the debate, cf. Skoie (2005:43-60). 
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The late 1970s and the 1980s were characterised by increased focus upon R&D and innovation as 
sources of national income. This was not least because economic and technological development 
had stagnated in several important industries, and because Europe was perceived as lagging 
behind both the U.S. and Japan. Consequently, R&D expenditures in the industry sector were 
reassessed, and evaluation and feedback about the actual quality and social impact of national 
research, was requested. These issues were among others addressed by the Thulin Commission in 
1980 (ibid.:32; Hauknes and Wicken 2002:11-12,14-18).  
 
One of the largest alterations in the R&D sector in the 1990s was the merging of the five 
different research councils which had been established through the years, into the Research 
Council of Norway. The new Council became responsible for the funding of research, and was 
furthermore entitled to formulate policy and give advice regarding national R&D and innovation 
policies (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:16). There were also several reforms within the university 
and college sector during this decade, as well as an increase in publications of government papers 
and other political documents concerned with R&D (Skoie 2005:32-33). The attention of policy 
makers was increasingly directed towards diffusing and transferring R&D results and objectives 
throughout the national system of innovation. A network perspective was employed because 
R&D activities affected a variety of sectors both directly and through externalities, and policies in 
these sectors therefore had to be seen as interlinked (Hauknes and Wicken 2002:13,17). Most of 
these processes show the relatively large role played by the Norwegian Government and major 
political actors in supporting, providing and arguing in favour of augmenting expenditures for 
R&D (Skoie 2005:36-38,278). This is underlined by statistics revealing that although private R&D 
funding has increased since the mid-1970s, the public expenditures for R&D are still much larger 
(Hauknes and Wicken 2002:26). The Government’s role can furthermore be seen as reflected in 
the ambitiousness of first adopting the OECD 2,3% goal, and then transferring the EU 3% 
objective into national R&D policies. 
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These numeric goals are among the factors pointing out how Norwegian R&D activities have 
been and still are, to a very large degree following and dependent on international developments 
within this policy sector. As described above, the OECD was for a very long time the major 
organisational actor in the field of R&D. In 2001 the member-states spent on average 2,3% of 
their total GDP on R&D activities. Norway was an OECD-member, however, expenditures on 
R&D were only 1,6% of the national GDP and Norway’s effort was therefore seen as lagging 
behind (Cappelen et al. 2004:29). Consequently, the Norwegian Government decided to increase 
national investments into R&D to the OECD average by 2005. The decision was based on the 
White Paper Forskning ved et tidsskille, arguing that Norway had to “strengthen research and 
development in a way that brings [the country] in line with the OECD-countries making the 
strongest bid for it” (St.mld. 1998-1999:7, my translation; St.prp. 2000-2001:36), and furthermore, 
on discussions in the Norwegian Parliament in February 2000 (OECD 2002c).  
 
However, national attention was to an increasing extent also directed towards Europe and the 
R&D development within the EU. This was not only a result of the Union augmenting the 
amount of resources devoted to R&D, but also because cooperation in general was increased 
between the Nordic countries and the EU. The trend was furthered by an agreement on research 
collaboration signed between Norway and the EU in 1987. Norwegian participation in several of 
the EU committees and programmes9 concerned with R&D has been made possible by the 
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. Furthermore, there was a more frequent focus 
upon European cooperation within technology, science and research in several important 
Norwegian Government papers,10 not least because international cooperation was seen as vital to 
increase the success and effect of national R&D policies. (Skoie 2005:224,254-255) “The 
‘Europeanisation’ of Norwegian knowledge policy has until recently been most noticeable in the 
area of national research policy” (Gornitzka 2006:23). 
                                                 
9 Among others, Norway has participated in the EU Framework Programmes since 1994. 
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4.3 The adoption of the 3% target 
4.3.1 Outline of the road from the OECD to the EU goal of expenditures 
The OECD cooperation within the field of R&D, was one of the first Norwegian institutional 
bonds with the North American research area after World War II. As shown in Chapter 3, the 
OECD was the largest and most important organisation in this policy field for several decades. It 
created an international forum for discussion and development of ideas and processes of great 
importance to all countries by linking research, science and technological efforts to economic 
cooperation, growth and welfare issues. Furthermore, earlier chapters have described how several 
OECD reports did not only lead to the distribution of innovations, but spurred new research 
activities, pointed out possibilities and alternatives in the R&D area, and encouraged scientific 
and technological efforts in member-state countries (Lundvall and Borrás 2005). Consequently, 
the Norwegian decision made in the year 2000 to increase national R&D expenditures in order to 
reach the OECD average of 2,3%, can be seen as a response to international trends of the 
decade. Similar arguments are valid when considering the adoption of the EU 3% target in 2004-
2005.  
 
Several reasons for the shift in Norwegian focus from the OECD to the EU in the area of R&D 
policy have already been pointed out in earlier descriptions of the development of OECD and 
EU research and development policies. Among these, are the broader focus of the Union, 
including not only economic and technological but also social aspects of R&D. Furthermore, the 
EU’s geographical proximity to Norway plays an important role, as does the country’s close 
relation to the Union through among others the EEA Agreement and the EU’s Framework 
Programmes for research. As Norway is a small country it has to a large extent also been 
necessary to concentrate its R&D focus on a few sectors and choose whether the largest 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 E.g. St.mld. (1988-1989), (1998-1999) and not least St.mld. (2004-2005). 
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investments should be made in the Nordic region, the EU, or in collaboration with North 
America. The Nordic region remains rather limited in size and scope although it has received 
renewed attention in the latest decades. Moreover, it is greatly influenced by the developments in 
European integration (Skoie 2005:260; Gornitzka 2006:24) Consequently, cooperation with the 
USA and Canada and especially the EU, has been more attractive for Norwegian R&D actors. 
 
Although Norway is not an EU-member, trends in the EU’s R&D sphere can be seen to 
influence national policies strongly (Gornitzka, forthcoming:198). Therefore, it is often 
considered necessary to follow the Union’s development to keep track with international 
fluctuations and enhance the competitive advantages of Norwegian R&D actors. This is not least 
a consequence of the fact that European integration is being deepened and broadened. The fear 
that non-membership will make Norway lag behind in the R&D area thereby is increasing. 
Numbers portrayed by Skoie (ibid.:256,261) show that cooperation with the EU accounted for 
nearly 1/3 of Norwegian expenditures for international research collaboration in 2002, and these 
investments have not decreased since. These expenditures can largely be seen as justified because 
data and evaluations regarding the EU’s 6th Framework Program show that the Norwegian 
participation approximately corresponds with the participation fee paid, and that applications 
with Norwegian participation have a great rate of success (CORDIS 2007b; St.mld. 2004-
2005:19,49-50; Langfeldt 2006). In addition to the fact that these close connections to European 
researchers, institutions, and not least the innovations resulting from R&D activities, are useful 
for Norway, the close contact with the Union also furthers the general collaboration between 
Norway and Europe (St.mld. 2004-2005:49). Skoie (2005:261) points out that this can be a way for 
Norwegian policy actors, including the national Government, to show that although Norway 
wishes to remain outside the Union, there is still a great interest in keeping close contact with the 
EU, follow its development, and contribute to the common goals of wealth and welfare for the 
region.  
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It is in this context that the adoption of the 3% goal has to be considered. It can be seen as a 
national response to the very ambitious policy goals set out by the EU at the Barcelona meeting 
in 2002. The EU 3% goal was officially transferred into Norwegian R&D policy through the 
adoption of the Government White Paper on research, Vilje til forskning, in March 2005. This 
document clearly shows how Norway’s focus also in the field of research, was mainly directed 
towards Europe and EU R&D activities (St.mld. 2004-2005). The internationalisation of research 
was furthermore established as one of the Government’s main priorities. Since World War II, 
Norwegian R&D policies have been largely characterised by consensus among actors involved in 
policy decisions (Kaloudis 2004:8; Skoie 2005:265). This was also the case for the process leading 
to the adoption of the EU 3% target (St.mld. 2004-2005). However, although the goal itself was 
largely agreed upon by the actors involved, the reasoning behind their arguments in favour of it 
varied, as will be discussed in the following. The actors focused on in this discussion will be the 
Norwegian Government, and relevant ministries, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
(NHO) and the Research Council of Norway. Because as Skoie argues “[t]he initiative for action 
has mainly been with the central administration and researchers and administrative organs in the 
area of R&D” (2005:265, my translation). 
 
4.3.2 Actors and arguments involved in the diffusion and adoption of the 
3% goal 
In this section I will consider the arguments of the actors pointed out above and discuss what 
tactics and claims they used in order to make their voices heard in the policy debate. Through all 
of this discussion, the different actors’ arguments are combined with the theoretical framework 
based on theories of diffusion and Europeanisation sketched out above.  
 
The Norwegian Government and the Ministries 
The Government White Paper on research, Vilje til forskning, published in 2005 stated that  
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to lift Norway to the position of a leading research nation the Government [among other things] wants to go 
in for that the joined research effort increases to 3% of GDP within 2010, where of 1% of GDP is to come 
from public sources.  
(St.mld. 2004-2005:17, my translation)  
 
Furthermore, it was argued that Norway was among the countries which had increased its public 
R&D expenditures the most during the last five years as well as made important policy decisions 
enhancing R&D activities. Nevertheless, Norway was still seen as facing challenges as the country 
was ”still a considerable distance below OECD-average with regard to joint research effort as 
share of GDP ” (ibid.:18-19, my translation). 
 
As to the 3% goal, the White Paper discussed several reasons why Norwegian R&D policies 
ought to be ambitious. According to the Paper, increasing R&D would further an open and 
enlightened public debate and lead to economic growth both for industry and enterprise, and 
society as a whole. Several indicators also pointed out that knowledge gained through R&D 
activities could solve main societal challenges concerning e.g. social security, environmental issues 
and unemployment. The Government furthermore argued that “the need to contribute to and 
utilise other countries’ research activity is an important argument to let the national research 
effort follow the development in other countries”, and therefore the current goal for Norwegian 
R&D activities should take the international development into consideration (ibid.:20-21, my 
translation). Regarding future efforts and goals, the following was emphasised by the 
Government: It was not seen as advisable to undertake major changes in present policy 
objectives. “The increasing internationalisation of research was to have real consequences for 
national priorities” (ibid.:24, my translation). Moreover, the Government regarded it as crucial to 
devote more resources to R&D activities in order to secure Norway’s participation in the next 
EU Framework Programme, as the former ones had proven to be of vital national importance 
(ibid.). “The realisation of priorities and the following up of the resource target are the 
Government’s main strategy to raise Norway to a leading research nation” and the goal “is to be 
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followed up by concrete means and realised through dialogue with research environments, social 
life as well as industry and commerce”. However, while “research environments have optimal 
conditions to give priority among concrete projects […], the superior decision on priorities and 
joint evaluation of national needs and precedences should be taken on the political level” 
(ibid.:30-31, my translation). 
 
As already pointed out, the politicians and employees in the ministries also have great influence 
on national R&D policies (Skoie 2005:265,278-279). More specifically, as argued by Kaloudis 
(2004:8), “the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and in particular, the Ministry of Research and 
Education under the leadership of the energetic minister Kristin Clemet, has as one of their 
primary policy goals the need to enhance innovation and R&D investments”. The following 
paragraphs will therefore briefly discuss how the 3% target was assessed by the ministries most 
concerned with R&D policies, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, and 
the Ministry of Education and Research (St.prp. 2005-2006c), and major policy actors within 
these. 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Of the 3% increase in R&D expenditures set out as the new goal for national R&D policy, 2% 
are to derive from investments made by private firms and enterprises. This was and still is 
considered the most challenging part of the 3% objective (NOU11 2005). The challenge was 
recognised by the Ministry of Trade and Industry which is responsible for the national 
administration of the Lisbon Strategy, and has published several reports concerning Norway’s 
fulfilment of the Strategy.12 The ministry argued that “a central challenge linked to this ambition 
                                                 
11 NOU, Norsk Offentlig Utredning, Official Norwegian Reports. These reports concern different aspects of society and are 
publications of the result from government or ministry working groups and committees. 
12 Cf. among others the reports from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Nærings- og handelsdepartementet) from 2004 and 
2006. These reports recognise the need for increasing private investments into R&D and, furthermore, show the shift from the 
OECD objective to the EU 3% goal of R&D expenditures. 
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target, is to trigger off and to stimulate business’ own R&D-effort” (St.prp.13 2005-2006a:19, my 
translation). Larger public spending on research was considered necessary in order to trigger 
private firms and enterprise to increase R&D expenditures (ibid.:30). Also other means planned 
to increase R&D investments from the private industry sector were pointed out (ibid.; Yrvin 
2006). Therefore, although the 3% goal was a challenging one in a national context with relatively 
small private R&D investments and a largely resource-based industrial structure, it was supported 
by this ministry. As stated already in 2004, “[i]nnovation is an important motive force behind 
business’ competitive ability and profitability, being a premise for the formation of values. An 
economy targeted R&D is one main component of a well acting innovation policy” (St.prp. 2004-
2005:21-22, my translation). 
 
The Ministry of Finance 
The Ministry of Finance’s main reaction related to the adoption of the 3% goal was to suggest 
larger public R&D expenditures, as well as new measures for increasing private R&D investments 
(St.prp. 2005-2006a:118). This indicates that the ministry had a favourable attitude towards the 
objective to increase Norwegian R&D. When the 3% goal was adopted in 2005, the Ministry of 
Finance was headed by Per Kristian Foss. He claims that the adoption of the 3% target into 
Norwegian R&D policy was a result of “ambitions and opinions shared by the political parties in 
Government at the time and the Norwegian Labour Party/the Socialist Left Party, that the 
Norwegian research effort had to be increased”. Furthermore, he claims that it was “a broad 
political wish that also Norway shall follow up the targets of competitive EU countries in the 
Lisbon strategy. Also, the influence from organisations as NHO and LO has been conducive” 
(Foss 2007, my translation). 
 
                                                 
13 St.prp., Stortingsproposisjon, Proposition to the Parliament (Storting). These propositions are used when the Government 
asks the Storting to make a decision that is not related to a law. 
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The Ministry of Education and Research 
As the Ministry of Education and Research is the one most directly concerned with Norwegian 
R&D efforts and the one with the largest expenditures for research activities (St.prp. 2005-
2006c:30-60), it can be considered the most important ministry for the process of transferring the 
EU 3% policy target into national policies. The vision of Norway as one of the world’s leading 
nations in the area of research and development figures prominently in a variety of documents14 
and is also used to justify the ambitious 3% objective. This ministry stressed the need for 
increasing private business R&D investments (St.prp. 2005-2006b:215), and furthermore 
supported a long-term plan for national R&D activities from 2006-2010, which aims at enhancing 
the public research effort (ibid.:221). This plan, promoted by the Parliament and adopted in 
Government, indicates that broad political support was given to increasing national R&D 
expenditures to 3% of GDP by 2010. The 3% target, its broad political foundation, and its great 
importance for Norway, has also been emphasised several times since 2005, not least in the 
present Government’s Soria Moria-Declaration and by the present Minister of Education and 
Research (2005:49; Djupedal 2006). Also Espen Solberg (2007), senior advisor in the ministry’s 
research department, underlines that both public and private R&D actors were in favour of 
adopting the 3% objective. 
 
In 2005, when the 3% goal was transferred into Norwegian R&D policy, the Ministry of 
Education and Research was headed by Kristin Clemet. When asked about the decision to adopt 
the EU policy goal she answered:  
 
I believe the process to have been quite simple: We saw no good reason for Norway not to adopt the same 
goal as the EU member-states, given the EU’s significance for Norway both economically and in the area of 
research. In addition, we thought there were several reasons in favour of increasing the Norwegian R&D 
efforts: Considerations relating to competitiveness, welfare policy, our global responsibility etc. We also 
                                                 
14 Cf. among others St.prp. (2005-2006a, b, c), St.mld. (2004-2005), chapter 5 in St.mld. (2003-2004), Clemet (2007) and 
Solberg (2007). 
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believed that an ambitious goal would help the politicians prioritise those issues they said they wanted to give 
priority to, and contribute to the necessary structural changes in the area of trade and industry. 
(Clemet 2007, my translation) 
 
The main arguments of the Norwegian Government, the ministries and central actors within 
these, related to the adoption of the 3% goal can be understood from an interest-based 
perspective. As shown, it was claimed that the realisation of the ambitious 3% objective would 
not only increase private R&D investments, contribute to making Norway one of the world’s 
leading countries in the area of R&D, enhance the possibilities to make use of other countries 
research efforts and results, and increase income of firms and enterprise, but also create positive 
externalities beneficial to the society as a whole. These are arguments based on Norwegian 
national interests. However, traces of rule-based arguments can also be found in the Government 
debate concerning the 3% goal. The ambitiousness of the EU objective did not represent 
something totally new, but can be regarded as an extension of the OECD goal already adopted 
into Norwegian R&D policies. Consequently, the transition between these targets did not 
represent a great shift in rules and institutions and can be seen to indicate an adaptation to 
common European R&D practices and institutions. By increasing the Norwegian R&D effort the 
3% objective would also contribute to greater national involvement in the international system of 
research activities such as the EU’s Framework Programmes. Moreover, an idea-based 
perspective can be seen as underlying the argument that there was no reason for Norway not to 
adopt the same R&D policy goal as most other European countries. Norway is a part of Europe 
and already cooperates closely with the EU in many areas. The arguments of the government 
actors indicate that it was seen as only natural that Norway shared the Union’s understandings 
and ideas about what policy objectives should be pursued.  
 
 
 
 
  63 
 
The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) 
The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise was clearly in favour of adopting the 3% R&D 
objective into Norwegian policy. They were conscious of the development of EU governance 
and that the use of ‘soft power’ methods, such as the OMC already described, had increased 
(NHO 2000:3). Consequently, Norway and other non-members did not have such easy access to 
decision-making processes through the EEA Agreement as they might have had before. For the 
NHO, close Norwegian follow-up of and contribution to the Lisbon strategy, was important to 
increase national involvement in EU developments for Norwegian firms and enterprise (ibid.). 
The NHO argued that “Norway has most to gain from a voluntary adaptation to EU’s activities 
in fields where Norwegian interests and compatibility are involved” and that Norway had not 
only to “create parallel national programs with similar directives and references, but establish 
identical indicators for concrete comparisons with the 15 EU-countries on fields defined by the 
Lisbon-strategy” (ibid., my translation). Furthermore the Confederation stated that  
 
[N]orwegian R&D contribution must be brought up to the level of our leading competitor countries. It is 
EU’s goal that within 2010 3% of GDP shall be used on R&D, industry and commerce being the source of 
2/3 of the growth. We should not have lower ambitions than our competitors within EU.  
(NHO 2004:44, my translation)  
 
And also, “Norway has to follow up [the Lisbon-process] closely, and involve itself where this is 
possible. We have to share its ambitions” (ibid.:51, my translation). According to the Ministry of 
Education and Research, conversations were taking place between the ministry and central actors 
from Norwegian private businesses and their organisations in advance of the decision to adopt 
the 3% target. These concerned the goals for Norwegian R&D policies. Here, the industry actors 
expressed that the 3% goal was ambitious but suitable for Norway (Solberg 2007). 
 
The arguments of the NHO can be explained by using an interest-based perspective. Arguments 
like “Norway has the most to gain from adapting to EU’s activities in areas concerning national 
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interests”, “Norwegian R&D efforts have to be increased to reach the levels of our main 
competitors”, and “we have to be just as ambitious as the EU” (NHO 2000:3, my translation), 
underline this. Furthermore, they indicate that the NHO as the largest Norwegian organisation 
for enterprise interests, was concerned by the prospects of Norwegian industries lagging behind 
European firms because of a lack of R&D investments. The fact that enterprise’s expenditures 
for R&D had increased steadily from 1970-2001, but then dropped from 51,5% in 2001 to 46% 
in 2005 (NIFU STEP 2005b), may have added to these worries. According to the 3% goal, 1/3 of 
the increased research expenditures should result from public, and 2/3 from private investments. 
As the R&D effort of Norwegian private firms is relatively low compared to other European 
countries, the goal will demand a substantial strengthening of privately induced research. This is 
especially a challenge for countries with a resource-based industrial structure like Norway’s (Skoie 
2005:231-232; European Commission 2006a:18). NHO-members’ interest in enhancing 
Norwegian industry’s competitiveness and thereby maximise profits and secure long-term 
economic growth can be seen as underlining the focus on goals, preferences and rational, 
strategic calculations of benefits in the Confederation’s argumentation.  
 
As pointed out above, the NHO stressed the need for Norway to be as ambitious as the EU. This 
argument also fits into an idea-based perspective, because it can be said to indicate how Norway’s 
imitation of the 3% goal is the result of a tendency to let political surroundings determine the 
policies adopted. The NHO claims that it is necessary to adopt not only similar but identical 
indicators to compare Norway with the EU countries in their effort to fulfil the Lisbon 
objectives. Consequently, EU policies which are seen as beneficial and as the right policy 
instruments also for the national context, will be imitated.  
 
Finally, the NHO’s arguments can be claimed to imply an effort to enhance systemic cooperation 
and networking, and the development of common institutions. The relationship between Norway 
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and the EU is considered to be largely one-way, from the Union to the national level. 
Consequently, the Norwegian follow-up of the Lisbon strategy can be regarded as a means to 
enhance national involvement in, and thereby also influence upon, the institutional environment 
and the EU network of policy actors. The focus upon the EU as a crucial stakeholder in the 
European policy sphere, has made the NHO deem Norwegian participation in this system, 
through among others adopting the 3% goal, necessary. Furthermore, participation can be seen 
as vital considering the position the NHO wishes to create for Norway in the international 
society. 
 
The Research Council of Norway (RCN) 
In May 2004 the Research Council of Norway provided its recommendations and inputs for the 
forthcoming Government White Paper on research, Vilje til forskning. Based on assessments of 
the major societal benefits, the RCN argued that the Norwegian R&D effort had to be increased. 
The private industry sector was seen as crucial in the process, as its R&D effort was lagging most 
behind both when compared to other Nordic and OECD countries. Also the EU was seen as a 
role model because of its vigorous debate about R&D policies and its very ambitious goals for 
the R&D effort. And although the RCN expressed that “[a]s to Norway, the OECD-goal is, 
nevertheless, ambitious. An increase to an average for OECD-countries, measured as R&D in 
percentage of GDP, will render possible the realisation of many ambitions on the field of 
Norwegian research and the formation of values”, it continued by saying that “the OECD-goal is 
a minimum goal” (Norges Forskningsråd15 2004:3, my translation). In a comment made just after 
the White Paper on research was published, the RCN stated that the 3% goal is a very ambitious 
one, but nevertheless “a correct and attainable goal” (ibid. 2005a:1, my translation). However, an 
increase in public expenditures for research was seen as crucial in order to reach the goal. 
According to the RCN it was necessary to  
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as quick as possible establish a concrete and binding economic stepping up schedule which the granting 
authorities, expert environments and enterprises are able to adjust their efforts to. Should this essential 
condition fail now, good and right ambitions will cause more harm than profit. 
(Stene-Larsen and Hallén 2005, my translation)  
 
The RCN saw a need of increasing the national R&D effort and therefore of having ambitious 
R&D goals. At the same time, however it emphasised the necessity of realistic policy objectives. 
It recognised the importance of coordinating Norwegian R&D policy targets with the targets of 
large international organisations as the OECD and the EU. Consequently, the argumentation of 
the RCN is in line with idea-based perspectives of Europeanisation. As the Council pointed out 
how other OECD and EU countries as well as other Nordic countries increased their R&D 
effort relative to Norway, it expressed a wish of learning from and cooperating with, these other 
nations. Furthermore, this signalled how the RCN shared several of the ideas underlying 
European R&D policies, and to a great extent had adapted to the common European 
understanding of policies in this area. 
  
Also, the RCN’s argumentation can be regarded as based upon the perspective underlining the 
importance of networks, institutions and common rules for policy formation. The Council 
claimed that the 3% goal suited the Norwegian context well. At the same time, however, it 
stressed the importance of coordinating the national economic effort with that of the different 
actors in the R&D policy sector in order to realise the goal. This shows how national networks of 
actors and their linkages to larger international systems of R&D actors, were considered crucial 
when the RCN favoured the adoption of the 3% target. The RCN’s claims can also be seen as 
rule-based, as common institutions and rules are vital parts of such networks and systems. 
 
As the RCN has a role as national research policy adviser, its opinions and recommendations are 
expected to represent and favour Norwegian R&D interests. However, in the debate concerning 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Norges Forskningsråd, Research Council of Norway (RCN) 
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the 3% goal, the traits of interest-based claims were less visible than the idea- and rule-based 
arguments described above. At the same time as the Council wanted to set out ambitious 
objectives for the national R&D policy, it is likely to have favoured realistic goals, as its effort to 
increase domestic R&D efforts otherwise would risk criticism. 
 
4.4 Living with the 3% target – a discussion 
4.4.1 The 3% target in a Norwegian context 
What has the development in Norwegian R&D policies been since the adoption of the 3% target 
in 2005? In 2005 Norwegian R&D expenditures were at their lowest level since 1985 and only 
constituted 1,53% of GDP (NIFU STEP 2006:3). Consequently, Norway was far from fulfilling 
its goal of reaching OECD average expenditures for R&D of 2,3%. And although official reports 
on the national budgets for 2006 and 2007 showed that this number was increasing, estimations 
concluded that the augmentation would not be enough to reach the 3% objective by 2010 (ibid. 
2005, 2006). According to NIFU STEP, investments would have to be more than doubled if the 
EU goal was to be attained (ibid. 2006:3). The report for 2006 states that “the new goal for 
growth is different from the previous one by, among others, being even more ambitious” (ibid. 
2005:4). Several other reports and research papers characterise the 3% target as “impossible” to 
reach (ibid. 2006:3), “unrealisable in the short term” (Norges Forskningsråd 2007), “arbitrary” 
(Maurseth 2006:4), and “totally unrealistic” (European Commission 2006a). Also, Skoie argues 
that the EU has itself given up on its goals for 2010 (2005:252). Consequently, based both on the 
numeric estimations, arguments made by central actors in the R&D policy field, and structural 
conditions, it can be claimed that the 3% objective does not fit into the Norwegian context 
(NIFU STEP 2004a:3).  
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There are several reasons why the goal can be difficult to realise in Norway. The most important 
is considered to be Norway’s large and continuously growing GDP (ibid. 2006:3, European 
Commission 2006a:18). As GDP grows, the amount of money which has to be spent on R&D in 
order to reach the 3% target also increases. Norway is a small country with a limited amount of 
firms, industries, research institutions and other areas where successfully and usefully to invest 
into R&D. Expenditures equal to 3% of GDP can therefore be considered too high. This, and 
the fact that Norwegian industry to a large extent is considered to be low R&D intensive, makes 
it especially difficult to reach the objective (St.mld. 2004-2005:22). Regarding the Norwegian 
industrial structure, Smith (2005:155) points to the problem that the R&D intensity of a country 
to a large extent depends on its industrial mix and whether its industry is high- or low-tech. If the 
ratio of business expenditure on R&D to the total production (BERD/GDP) in an industry in 
one country is high, this does not necessarily show that this industry is more R&D intensive than 
another industry in another country. Rather it may reflect the fact that industrial structures differ 
across countries (ibid.; Fagerberg 2004:9). The Norwegian economy is to a great extent 
depending on what is often considered low-tech industries in the oil and gas sector, as well as a 
large number of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (European Commission 2006a:5-6; 
Castellacci 2007:16). Consequently, “Norwegian businesslife is dominated by business which in 
all countries has a relatively low content of R&D related to production value” (Skoie 2005:227-
228). And it will be difficult to augment R&D expenditures measured as a share of GDP as long 
as “as one is content to expand existing trades” (ibid.). Furthermore, “the level of education and 
competence in the Norwegian workforce is higher than in other countries” (Maurseth 2006:5, my 
translation). This is also the case for those workers who are not engaged in R&D activities. 
Therefore, the ability to innovate and make use of new technologies is enhanced. “Consequently, 
important considerations forming the basic reason for high R&D efforts, are likely to be taken 
care of in other ways in Norway” (ibid., my translation). According to these arguments, “[f]irst 
and foremost a significant drop in prices in the petroleum sector and/or something close to a 
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collapse in Norwegian economy in general, would be able to efficiently reverse the negative 
trend” and lead to the fulfilment of the 3% target (NIFU STEP 2006:4, my translation). 
 
Consequently, a paradox is underlying the main reason why Norway lags behind regarding the 
3% objective: “Norway’s weak results as to the GDP-target [are motivated by] Norway’s success 
in what the EU does not succeed with and what is the very aim of the Lisbon- and Barcelona-
goals: high and stable economic growth” (ibid., my translation). Moreover, it is said that “there is 
no reason to believe that Norwegian industry – as it is today – need such levels of R&D 
investments even in the long run” (European Commission 2006a:18). Nevertheless, as has been 
shown by describing actors and discussing arguments as well as central R&D related documents 
involved in the adoption of the 3% target into Norwegian R&D policy, it can be claimed that 
there is both a wish for and a need to increase Norway’s R&D expenditures. What can be 
questioned, however, is the argument that this increase should correspond to 3% of GDP. Such 
growth-related goals have “given unstable, approximate and evidently unrealistic goal/figures” 
and furthermore, contributed to giving Norwegian R&D policies a one-sided focus upon growth 
alone (NIFU STEP 2006:4, my translation; Skoie 2005:282-283). This can lead to a situation 
where no concrete tasks are outlined for future R&D efforts and investments, which can both be 
seen as a situation characterised by indifference and not least, a contradiction to the official policy 
document on R&D (Skoie ibid.; St.mld. 2004-2005). According to Fagerberg (2004:8) it is 
important to view innovation in the context of the wider set of factors influencing it, and not 
exclusively as a result of the amount of R&D investment. 
 
These arguments were reinforced by the debate arising in the wake of the OECD report 
‘Economic Survey of Norway 2007’, published in January (Castellacci 2007; Hauknes 2007; Moen 
2007; Kallerud 2007). This type of report, dealing with OECD assessments and 
recommendations on the main economic challenges of each member-state, is published every 
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1½-2 years. However, the report from 2007 was introduced to a national context where the 
importance of factors such as innovativeness, R&D effort and economic performance and not 
least the mechanisms underlying them, were stressed more than ever. Consequently, the 
conclusions of the OECD turned out to be rather controversial. It can be said to rightly point 
out that Norwegian investments into R&D are relatively small compared to other countries, and 
that Norwegian private firms and enterprises do not innovate as much as their European 
counterparts. Consequently, Norway does not fit into any known theoretical framework about 
innovation and R&D processes and policies. However, the report does give any alternative 
interpretations to answer the ‘Norwegian puzzle’ (ibid.; OECD 2007). Contrary to the OECD 
report, the fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) published at more or less the same time 
by the EU, shows a quite different story where the Norwegian high-technology industries are 
among Europe’s most innovative (Castellacci 2007). This can be said to underline both how 
different measures of innovativeness as well as varying industrial structures across countries can 
influence on statistics and reports concerned with R&D investments and activities. Furthermore, 
the discussion indicates that it can be useful if not to replace then at least supplement, 
quantitative measures of R&D efforts with qualitative ones. 
 
4.4.2  Holding on to the 3% target 
Why, if it can be argued that the 3% goal will be both very difficult to reach and that its 
realisation will not necessarily be desirable in a Norwegian context, did it nevertheless become a 
national R&D policy goal? Several arguments used by a variety of actors have already been 
discussed. These where shown as mainly falling into three categories: interest-based, rule-based 
and idea-based. In the following I will outline what can be seen as the main general arguments for 
the transfer of the 3% objective from the EU to the Norwegian policy level. Just as for the 
arguments of the actors above, I will divide these claims into three theoretical categories. This 
will not only contribute to the understanding of the factors underlying the different arguments, 
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but also tie these arguments to the theoretical framework of this thesis as well as to the broader 
theoretical perspectives in the field of Science and Technology Studies and political science 
reviewed in Chapter two. 
 
Interest-based arguments 
As stated by the European Commission in their annual innovation policy report on Norway,  
 
there might be political reasons for choosing [..the 3%..] objective, even if it is unrealistic. […] Even if 
Norway is not a member of EU it is hard for a rich country like this one to demonstrate weaker ambitions 
than the EU average. 
(2006:18) 
 
In line with this claim, the EU R&D policy goal can be argued to have a status-enhancing effect 
(Hall 2005:469-70). Because, “once a critical mass of states ha[ve] adopted a [new and innovative] 
policy, it be[comes] a badge of legitimacy or credibility to have one” (Walker 1969:890). On the 
one hand, therefore, the transfer of the 3% goal can be seen as beneficial for Norwegian science 
and technology development. Furthermore, however, it can be said to increase Norway’s political 
capital and leverage internationally by showing the Norwegian interest in the progress of Europe 
as a whole. Therefore, while the 3% goal has been characterised as unattainable and an 
insufficient solution to the perceived problem of low Norwegian R&D investments, it can 
nevertheless be seen as an example of solution-driven diffusion and consequently be an answer 
to a political challenge. It shows how actors in the Norwegian R&D sector are willing to commit 
to ambitious policy goals, and this commitment to increase Norwegian R&D efforts can turn out 
to be more important than actually reaching the 3% goal. Also the domestic legitimacy of the 
actors favouring such ambitious and popular targets can be enhanced from the adoption of the 
3% target. It is argued that “the motivation to innovate stems from the desire by politicians to 
win elections, and whether they will adopt popular or unpopular innovations depends on their 
degree of electoral security” (Black 2005b:26). Consequently, a policy decision to innovate can 
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depend on how close the time of adoption is to the next political election (ibid.; Walker 1969; 
Mintrom 1997). As the Government White Paper establishing the 3% objective as a Norwegian 
policy goal was published in March 2005 and the following Parliamentary elections were in 
September 2005, this claim can be considered valid also in the Norwegian context. However, this 
may also imply that the issue of internationalisation and Europeanisation of research policies, and 
thereby the adoption of the 3% goal, is merely an objective for lip service (Meulen 2002:262). 
This can also be taken as an example of the distinction often made between words and deeds or 
the loose coupling often found between talk and action.16 As pointed out by March (1994:196) 
“the act of supporting a policy with appropriate symbolic meaning can be more important to 
decision makers than its adoption, and its adoption can be more important than its 
implementation”. Consequently, adoption does not necessarily lead to implementation and policy 
change, but rather can be only superficial and political propaganda (Black 2005b:28). This also 
shows how freely pursued goals, as the 3% target, will need commitment from the actors 
adopting them in order to be reached (Citi and Rhodes 2007:12-13). 
 
Rule-based arguments 
In several policy areas, including research policy, the EU is the most relevant international 
institution in Norway’s political environment and has great influence on Norwegian policy 
decisions (Claes and Tranøy 1999:1-14). It is claimed that Norwegian participation in the EU 
research arena is “in the process of acquiring a rulelike status” (Gornitzka and Langfeldt, 
forthcoming:196). Norwegian policy actors considering the Union as a role model can therefore 
be seen as arguing in favour of keeping up with EU standards and member-state requirements 
(Black 2005b:28). Norway’s geographically rather peripheral position combined with the fact that 
the country is not an EU-member, can be said to imply also political periphery (Gornitzka 
                                                 
16 See among others March (1994:195-198), Elster (1989:37-38), or Gornitzka, Kogan and Amaral (2005:7-9) for an elaboration 
on this and related issues. 
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2006:22-23). As a result, it becomes important to follow international rules and common 
practices of the European R&D community as well as show the ability to contribute to the 
common cause (Gornitzka and Langfeldt, forthcoming:196). Moreover, it is claimed that a higher 
degree of integration will ease the innovation process and enhance the sustainability of 
competitive advantages (Hall 2005:118-121). Political actors in favour of cooperating closely with 
the Union will therefore focus on how adopting EU policies increases Norwegian innovativeness, 
competitiveness and its connectedness to the European continent, as shown for the different 
actors in the discussion above. Furthermore, actors are likely to use the Lisbon Strategy as an 
acknowledged, international point of reference. In this context, the 3% goal can be seen as an 
international indicator of what constitutes an appropriate R&D expenditure level. The effect 
which the 3% target has as a mobilising factor rather than just being a quantitative target for 
research policy, is stressed by among others the Scientific and Technical Research Committee of 
the EU (CREST 2006). Also, the Lisbon Strategy has a clear and official position in the 
Norwegian R&D policy community as it stands for a specific political development which to a 
great extent fits the Norwegian policy structure and Norway’s national goals (Gornitzka 
2006:29,35). In addition, the fact that Norway is already extensively involved in the Union’s 
general policy coordination and shaped by its actions and regulations, can explain the adaptation 
taking place.  
 
The adaptational pressure resulting among others from real and perceived differences across 
countries, will be important for processes of policy transfer (Trondal 2002:337). In the case of 
the 3% target, the perceived differences between Norway’s goal of reaching the OECD average 
expenditures for R&D and the EU objective, are likely to have been large enough to foster 
adaptation. At the same time, however, it can be argued that the compatibility between the two 
numerical policy goals eased the adaptation process. Furthermore, the already mentioned 
argument made by Nelson and Winter’s (1982) regarding the tendency for organisations to search 
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for new practices in the vicinity of present practices, and the importance of both continuity and 
creativity for the innovation process, can be seen as relevant for this policy goal transition. The 
OECD goal can be said to have made the area of R&D policy accustomed with high, and 
arguably also unrealistic, quantified targets. And while building on the OECD target represents 
continuity, the EU 3% objective can be regarded as the novel element in the innovation process. 
 
Idea-based arguments 
It has been argued that the Bologna Declaration on higher education cooperation in Europe, 
simplified the choice for Norwegian actors regarding which practices to adopt in the policy field 
of education (Gornitzka 2006:29). A similar trend, which can be regarded as based upon 
common understandings, processes of learning and transfer of ideas, can be seen in relation to 
the Lisbon Strategy and the adoption of the 3% target. The possibility for Norway to participate 
in and have access to, policy arenas within the EU can be seen as very important as the opposite 
“would entail not only a lost opportunity for promoting a national interest, but also being cut off 
from circulation of ideas and information” (Gornitzka and Langfeldt, forthcoming:198). 
Norway’s commitment to the EEA Agreement, to developing the ERA, as well as participation 
in the EU’s Framework Programmes can be seen in light of this argument. Moreover, it 
underlines the common understanding of R&D policy objectives between the EU and Norway 
shown in the Norwegian policy-making community, even across party political dividing lines 
(Skoie 2005:259). The linkage between the development of the ERA and the 3% target can be 
seen as strengthening the legitimacy of adopting such a policy goal.  
 
As already mentioned and as described by among others Gornitzka and Langfeldt 
(forthcoming:171-172), idea-based adaptation may involve the transfer of policy objectives from 
the international to the national environment. Such transfer does, however, not necessarily 
include the instruments needed to attain the adopted goal (ibid.). In the context of Norway’s 
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adoption of the 3% objective, these instruments can be said to involve the national industrial 
structure and the political will needed to sufficiently increase R&D expenditures. The lack of 
these factors can, consequently, be used to explain the Norwegian difficulties of attaining the 
goal. It is also necessary to keep in mind that for the EU the 3% target is a goal for the Union as 
a whole. Consequently, several of the member-states have opted for national R&D expenditure 
targets which are substantially lower, but arguably more realistic, than 3%. The reason why 
Norway has, nevertheless, adopted the 3% objective can be related to those countries, including 
among others the Nordic EU member-states, that have actually endorsed the Lisbon target 
(European Commission 2006b). As these are countries with political, economic and social 
structures similar to Norway’s, they can be seen as those most relevant for comparison. The 
adoption of the 3% objective can therefore be said to express a Norwegian wish to ‘be like the 
others’ in the field of R&D policy, the others here being the EU member-states.  
 
Furthermore, idea-based arguments favouring the 3% target can be based on considerations of 
the ‘goodness of fit’. As already mentioned, according to the ‘compliance approach’ and literature 
on organisational and institutional innovation, a low ‘goodness of fit’ can result in learning and 
imitation (Radaelli 2003:44-46, Nedergaard 2006:424-425). “If countries adopting EU models 
provide a critical mass, the remaining countries can feel the force of attraction of the EU ‘centre 
of gravity’ and join in” (Radaelli 2003:42). The degree of imitation and learning, its exact form 
and thereby the impact of Europeanisation will, however depend largely on institutional factors 
which can differ greatly from country to country. As a result, the ‘compliance approach’ usually 
distinguishes between the Europeanisation happening through enforcement and that happening 
because of management decisions. An example can be an EU member-state as opposed to a 
country which is not a Union member. A great deal of the decisions made at the EU government 
level result in regulations which are mandatory for the member-states to implement. This type of 
Europeanisation therefore happens through enforcement. On the other hand, certain non-
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member countries, such as Norway, have a tendency to adopt several EU laws and regulations 
without being legally obliged to do so. This type of adaptation can be seen as a consequence of 
management decisions taken because they are believed to ease the management of processes in 
different policy areas. Such decisions are especially easy to make in cases where ‘the goodness of 
fit’ is high, as it can be argued to have been for adoption of the 3% target. (ibid.: 44-46) 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This thesis has investigated the question of why and how the objective of the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy to increase R&D expenditures to 3% of GDP by 2010, has become a Norwegian policy 
goal. It does so by drawing on literature about diffusion and organisational and systemic aspects 
of innovation from Science and Technology Studies, and theories on regulatory and policy 
innovation and Europeanisation from Political Science. Furthermore, actors and arguments 
involved in this process of policy adoption have been analysed. This chapter resumes the thesis’ 
main findings, gives a short account of its theoretical implications and discusses its relevance for 
future research. 
 
In short, this case study can be said to indicate that the adoption of the 3% target into Norwegian 
R&D policy was indeed a result of policy diffusion. Furthermore, it points out how the 
identification of actors’ interest-based, idea-based, and rule-based arguments can be vital for 
understanding the process leading to the transfer of this EU policy goal. 
 
5.1 Main findings 
As shown in Chapter three, the establishing of a separate policy field for R&D was a result of 
among others increased focus upon and recognition of research, innovation and diffusion as 
important driving forces not only for development within the R&D sector, but also for 
economic, societal and political processes. More attention was, therefore, directed towards R&D 
also in international organisations like the OECD and the EU. Furthermore, national R&D 
policies were clearly shaped by and depending on, developments taking place within these 
organisations. As described and discussed in the first parts of Chapter four, Norwegian R&D 
policies were no exception. Consequently, the adoption of the 3% objective can be seen as a 
result of Europeanisation, that is, policy diffusion from the EU to the national policy sphere. 
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In order to answer the question of how and why the 3% target became a Norwegian policy 
objective, it was also important to identify and analyse central actors and arguments involved in 
the adoption process. This was done in the latter parts of Chapter four. Drawing on the broad 
theoretical foundation and the combination of theories established in Chapter two, I found the 
actors’ claims to fall into three categories according to the motivating factors underlying them. 
These categories consist of interest-based, idea-based, and rule-based arguments which can all be 
seen as highly related to, and providing increased insight into, Europeanisation of national 
policies and the adoption of the 3% objective. Furthermore, this study shows how a policy goal 
such as the 3% target can be said to benefit and therefore be favoured by different interest 
groups, not only those receiving the direct advantages of increased R&D expenditures. 
 
In the last part of Chapter four the development in Norwegian R&D policies after the adoption 
of the 3% target, was discussed. Factors like the size of Norwegian GDP and the national 
industrial structure were pointed out as reasons for why this policy goal has been difficult to 
reach in a Norwegian context. Moreover, arguments for why Norwegian R&D actors have 
chosen to hold on to the EU goal were pointed out. When these were related to the established 
theoretical frame from Chapter two, also these arguments were seen to fall into the categories of 
interest-based, idea-based and rule-based claims. This can be seen as increasing further the 
explanatory power of my combination of theories. 
 
5.2 Some theoretical implications 
The study of the adoption of the 3% objective into Norwegian R&D policies shows how it is 
possible to augment the explanatory power of theory by combining theoretical aspects from 
different fields of study. In this case, the combination of approaches to diffusion and innovation 
drawn from STS and Political Science outlined in Chapter two, can be said to imply increased 
understanding of how and why policy diffusion from the EU to the national level takes place. 
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This is not least because theories from both disciplines can be seen to point out interest-, idea- 
and rule-based mechanisms and motivating factors at work in transferring the 3% target. 
Furthermore, the extensive review of literature resulting in a broad theoretical foundation for this 
thesis, shows how actors’ arguments can be analysed and understood in the light of a variety of 
theoretical perspectives. 
 
There are some weaknesses to be considered concerning the relevance of this study’s findings. 
First, it can be noted that the division of arguments involved in the adoption of the 3% target 
into interest-based, idea-based, and rule-based claims, was not a straightforward one. Several 
motivating factors can be seen as underlying the same argument, and consequently the dividing 
lines between the three categories to some extent became blurred. Also, the ability to generalise 
from a single case study, which was briefly discussed in part 2.4.4 on limitations of this research, 
should be regarded. The adoption of the 3% target was found to be an example of policy 
diffusion through Europeanisation, and the theoretical combination and categories of interest-
based, idea-based and rule-based arguments were relevant in this case. However, these 
explanations will not necessarily be valid for other studies, although their topic may be related. 
 
Furthermore, while the combination of diffusion theories contributed to the understanding of 
the adoption of the 3% objective, the theories’ explanatory power can be seen as reduced when 
trying to assess the implementation, or lack of implementation, of this R&D policy goal. As 
pointed out in the first part of Chapter four, the 3% objective is often regarded as unsuitable for 
the Norwegian domestic context. Clearly, therefore, other mechanisms were at work when 
adopting what can be seen as ‘the talk’, than are needed to be able to ‘walk the walk’. 
Consequently, alternative theoretical perspectives, such as that of policy translation, can be 
considered more apt for analysing the processes taking place after the adoption of the EU goal. 
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Policy translation theory takes into account the changes imposed on policies when they meet the 
national R&D environment and are translated in order to fit in. 
 
5.3 Scenarios for future research 
The application of policy translation theory to the case of implementation of the 3% target, can 
therefore be seen as one possibility for further research. Case studies of R&D policies in other 
countries which have adopted the 3% target, as well as comparative analysis involving several 
countries, could also be of interest. Such studies may contribute to knowledge both about policy 
diffusion and the implications thereof. It could also be interesting to conduct a study similar to 
this case study of the 3% objective, in later years to address the degree to which the target was 
actually attained and the processes underlying this development. 
 
This case study of the adoption of the EU R&D policy goal also shows how policies can be used 
to attain several goals, not only those stated explicitly. While the 3% target has not been reached 
and is said to be both unrealistic and unrealisable, it has nevertheless created debate and increased 
focus upon R&D policies, actors and arguments. This renewed focus may not only direct 
attention towards the needs to increase R&D expenditures, but furthermore enhance the interest 
in processes of policy diffusion through Europeanisation and how they contribute to policy 
innovation and formation. 
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